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Holly: Potential Responsibility under CERCLA: Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v.

POTENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY UNDER CERCLA:
CANADYNE-GEORGIA CORP. v. NATIONSBANK, NA. (SOUTH)AN ILLUSTRATION OF WHY WE NEED A COMMON
FEDERAL RULE DEFINING "OWNED" AND "OPERATED"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the "C" in CERCLA stands for "comprehensive," it is
debatable whether the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
2
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 in fact lives up to its name.
The uncertain meaning of "comprehensive" in CERCLA is particularly important to those courts who operate in the face of Congress'
silence on issues surrounding non-uniform treatment in the courts
3
and in doing so, struggle to pursue Congress' intent.
1. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, CERCLA §§ 101-175, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1996). CERCLA is
often referred to as the "Superfund," as cleanup costs under CERCLA are funded
by money allocated by Congress. The Superfund is used when necessary for financing cleanup of contaminated sites. See Percival et al., ENViRONMENATAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY 291 (3d ed. 2000).
2. See WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INT'D DICrIONARY 467 (1986) (defining compre-

hensive as "covering a matter under consideration completely or nearly completely" and as "accounting for or comprehending all or virtually all pertinent
considerations"). This Comment considers two coverage issues - the completeness
of subject matter covered in CERCLA text and the extent to which CERC[A brings
parties into CERCLA control through its potential responsibility provisions. Accordingly, on one hand, "comprehensive" may be construed as meaning "thorough" or "self-descriptive." Yet another understanding of the term "comprehensive" is "broad in coverage."
In the sense that comprehensive means "broad in coverage," some believe
CERCLA is too comprehensive. See S. REP. No. 103-349, at 39-41 (1994) (Senate
Reform Act of 1994) (listing three areas of criticism, including: (1) liability system
of CERCLA, applying jointly, severally, strictly and retroactively, as unfair; (2)
transaction costs are too onerous and (3) liability scheme is too broad and includes certain parties never intended to be included).
This Comment visits the third category listed in the Senate Reform Act of
1994 and joins Blake A. Watson in questioning whether lower courts have taken a
good thing too far in liberally construing CERCLA. See generally Blake A. Watson,
Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower
Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?,20 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 199 (1996) (discussing
remedial purpose canon). In doing so, this Comment specifically focuses on Eleventh Circuit precedent, including Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments,
94 F.3d 1489 (lth Cir. 1996) and Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A.
(South), 183 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
3. See, e.g.,
Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A. (South), 183 F.3d
1269, 1275, n.9 (11th Cir. 1999)(considering argument regarding liability based
on pursuit of Congress' intent). An example of an area where courts have differed
and Congress has not indicated how to deal with such a discrepancy is whether to
use state law in defining ownership for purposes of CERCLA. See United States v.
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Amendments to CERCLA may have remedied some of the ambiguities in the statute but inconsistent outcomes are still likely in
certain circumstances. 4 This is particularly true given the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Bestfoods,5 which held that there
need not be a single federal standard for defining ownership under
CERCLA. 6 In so holding, the Supreme Court has reinforced Congress' legacy of allowing inconsistent resolution of CERCLA
litigation.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit accepted the
Supreme Court's invitation to use applicable Georgia law in
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998) (noting that Congress has not specifically stated
intent that entire body of state law be replaced with common federal law). The
alternative is to resort to a common federal rule. See id. Congress' intent that
responsible parties be held liable is a goal courts often attempt to effectuate when
assigning CERCLA liability. See, e.g., Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269. There is criticism,
however, that courts are going too far in holding parties liable who were never
intended to be held potentially responsible. See, e.g., Douglas M. Garrou, Note, The
Potentially Responsible Trustee: Probable TargetFor CERCLA Liability, 77 VA. L. REV. 113
(1991) (discussing criticisms of overly-broad interpretation of potential responsibility under CERCLA which includes trustees). Hence, there is some question as
to how comprehensive and broad in scope CERCLA was meant to be. See id. at
123-26 (discussing ambiguity in CERCLA of whether all title holders should be
accountable as owners). The source of much of this confusion lies with the statutory definition of "owner and operator," which is circularly defined as "anyone
owning or operating a facility." See id.; see also Long Beach Unified School District
v. Dorothy B. Godwin California Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1994)
(asserting that circular definition of "'owner or operator' is as helpful as 'defining
'green' as 'green;'" and looking to ordinary meaning of terms).
4. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-349, at 39-40 (1994), codified at CERCLA §107
(n)(1), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n)(1) (amending CERCLA and clarifying Congress' intent with respect to personal liability for fiduciaries). Inconsistent outcomes are
still likely because issues such as defining ownership for partnerships differ among
the fifty states. See John E. Blyth, Mastering CriticalIssues FacingBuyers, Sellers and
Lenders Due Diligence When Dealing With Selected Entities, 448 PLI/REAL 119 (1999)
(comparing ownership laws among states).
5. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
6. See id. at 63 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) in holding
in case dealing with corporate veil piercing that "CERCLA is like many other congressional enactments in giving no indication 'that the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is based
upon a federal statute"'). The Supreme Court noted that there was no clear legislative intent with respect to the need for uniformity and thus concluded that "'[i] n
order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must speak directly to the
question addressed by the common law.'" Id. (citing United States v. Texas, 507
U.S. 529, 534 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Many circuits were already in the practice of applying state law. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1498 (stating that "[i]n the absence of any unique definition of "ownership" in CERCLA, we look to Alabama law .... ."); Long Beach United
Sch. Dist., 32 F.3d at 1364 (applying common law of easements, looking to case law
from California, Texas, and Kentucky). Thus, the Supreme Court's permissive language essentially bound federal courts to their own precedent of applying state
law. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 51. In this regard, it is not surprising the Eleventh
Circuit chose to apply state law in Canadyne. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273.
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Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A. (South).7 The Eleventh
Circuit, in Canadyne, developed a rule for defining prior ownership
which is even more unclear than the definition provided in CERCLA.8 It is clear, however, that Canadyne cast a vast net of potential
responsibility pertaining to the meaning of prior owner. 9 In doing
so, Canadyne added to CERCLA's overall comprehensiveness in a
way that holds parties no longer having ties to an environmental
cleanup site potentially responsible, who if analyzed under current
state law, would escape liability. 10 It is impossible to definitively as7. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269. Canadyne dealt with partnership law and it
is in this context that this Comment argues a common federal law may be necessary. See id. The common federal law proposed in this Comment would determine
prior ownership according to current state laws but would render inoperative state
law that allows entities' ownership to be determined according to non-current
standards.
8. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273 (applying state law to find party potentially
responsible even though that party would not be found potentially responsible
under current state law). The rule creates ambiguity because each case involving
an alleged prior owner will require analysis of state law, some of which may be
overruled, either through subsequent case law or statutorily. See Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A. (South), 982 F. Supp. 886, 888-89 (M.D. Ga. 1997),
rev'd, 183 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law from 1893 and 1946).
Although the extent to which the Eleventh Circuit used Georgia case law is unclear, it is clear the Eleventh Circuit used a version of Georgia law which differs
from current Georgia law. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273. It is also clear that the
Eleventh Circuit regarded its finding of ownership, "anachronistic." Id. at 1273,
n.7. The Eleventh Circuit, nonetheless, justified its use of state law by the precedent of Bestfoods, which affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's holding in Redwing Carriers.
See id.
9. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273 (holding party responsible whose ties to environmental cleanup cite had long been severed and who, if analyzed under current partnership law, would not be labeled potentially responsible).
10. See id. Current law is discussed throughout this Comment in contrast to
historical law. The difference is best illustrated by partnership law. Partnerships
are generally dealt with according to state adopted versions of uniform partnership
laws. See Blyth, supra note 4 at 133 (stating for example that uniform partnership
laws pertaining to limited partnerships have been adopted in Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). These partnership statutes are generally written such that entities are governed according to laws in effect at the time
of entity formation. See id. at 131. Hence, current state law may hold that a limited
partnership formed prior to July 1, 1991, will be governed by the Revised Limited
Partnership Act ("RLPA") and those formed thereafter are governed by the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("RULPA"). See id. Additionally, some
states have adopted RULPA without repealing RLPA. See id. Moreover, state case
law in operation at the time of partnership formation would be looked to in order
to interpret ownership statutes in operation at that time, even if such case law has
since been reversed. See id. at 131-33. It is obvious that uniformity in partnership
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sert that Georgia's broad CERCLA responsibility is contrary to Congress' intent because of the paucity of legislative history on the
matter. 1 This Comment argues that the reasoning in other Eleventh Circuit decisions and the Supreme Court precedent fails to
support the conclusion reached in Canadyne. Additionally, this
Comment supports the creation of a common federal law, which if
12
in operation, would have vindicated the defendant in Canadyne.
In reaching the above conclusion, this Comment in section I
discusses the complexity involved in defining prior ownership under
CERCLA and more specifically addresses the problems arising for
individuals and entities, such as trustees and corporations, for whom
legal and equitable ownership may not necessarily converge.1 3 In
law increases as more states adopted ULPA and RULPA. See id. at 131. Naturally,
therefore, there is increasingly less uniformity the further back in time ownership
occurred. In short, there is an inverse relationship between year of ownership and
the need for a common federal rule (i.e., the farther back in time of ownership,
the more the need for a common federal rule). A common federal rule requiring
a uniform method for determining ownership will provide uniformity to the assessment of potential responsibility under CERCLA and eliminate confusion generated from analyzing potentially overruled state case law.
11. See Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and OperatorAnalysis Under
CERCLA: Finding Order in the Chaos of Pervasive Control, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 223, n.3
(1994) (noting that "[c]ourts have repeatedly criticized CERCLA [ ] for its sparse
legislative history" (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d
Cir. 1985) (noting CERCLA is 'an eleventh hour compromise' and has an inadequate legislative history); see also Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Armstrong World
Indus., 669 F.Supp. 1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (observing "CERCLA's legislative history is sparse and generally uninformative" and "last-minute additions and
deletions to the statute render its legislative history of little practical use"); United
States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) (stating "CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite, if
not contradictory, legislative history"); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103,
1109 (D.N.J. 1983) (describing CERCLA as "inadequately drafted"); United States
v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating "the legislative history is
unusually riddled by self-serving and contradictory statements").
12. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts., 94 F.3d 1489, 1489 (11th Cir.
1996) (providing analysis for determining whether federal common law should be
formed for ruling on federal statute); see also United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
440 U.S. 715, 717 (1979) (providing test for determining whether to adopt a common federal law). The common federal law proposed would repeal dated state
statutes pertaining to ownership which operate as non-repealed statutes under existing state law.
13. See William B. Johnson, Annotation, PrivateEntity's Status as Owner or Operator Under §107(A)(1,2) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (42 U.S.C.A. §9607(A)), 140 A.L.R. FED. 181, §2(a) (1997) (stating
"[w]here entities have held title to a contaminated facility, there has been relatively little litigation on the issue of whether they qualified as 'owners' for purposes
of CERCLA liability"). See generally Gail A. Flesher & Dale S. Bryk, How to Incur
Liability Without Really Trying: The Perils of Parenthood Under CERCLA, 3 J. ENrL. L.
& PRAc. 4, 5 (1996) (stating parent companies are generally not responsible for
liabilities of subsidiaries but in environmental arena, where statutory provisions are
broadly drafted and often vague, and where public policy favors imposing liability
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line with the Eleventh Circuit's prior adjudication, this topic is ana14
lyzed by focusing on partnerships.
Section II of this Comment presents pertinent statutory language of CERCLA, as well as a discussion of the underlying goals
and statutory amendments to CERCLA legislation. Section III discusses judicial interpretations of the meaning of "owner" and "prior
owner." Section IV describes the rule adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Canadyne.1 5 Congress' likely response to the Canadynerule is
discussed in section V. Section VI presents an argument for the use
of a common federal law for determining prior ownership for purposes of CERCLA. In conclusion, section VII describes the benefits
derived from having such a federal rule.
Congress has made some headway toward increasing CERCLA's comprehensiveness with its adoption of subsequent amendments, but it has not gone so far as to define ownership within the
statute.16 Although statutory definitions would be the ideal method
on those who benefit from activity rather than leaving liability with taxpayers, the
general rule against holding parent responsible for sins of its child has been altered, sometimes radically, by courts).
The prototypical "ownership" case is a party who holds legal title and helps
run a chemical manufacturing plant that disposes of hazardous substances. See id.
In short, this prototypical owner owns and operates a facility by holding legal title
and serving in a fiduciary capacity while simultaneously exhibiting a level of control substantial enough to empower him to prevent the release of hazardous substance. See id.
14. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1498-1500 (discussing whether to use state
law or federal common law in case dealing with partnership owners). While it is
true that increasingly more states have adopted versions of uniform partnership
laws, partnerships formed earlier in time were not usually subject to the uniform
partnership laws. See Blyth, supra note 4, at 133. This problem presents itself because courts look to partnerships at the time of partnership formation in assessing
ownership for purposes of CERCLA. Thus, if Company A (current owner of site
X) is forced to clean-up site X, Company A is likely to seek contribution from
Company B (prior owner of site X). If Company B, however, was involved with
Company C as a partner in co-ownership of site X, a court will have to analyze
partnership law from the time when Company B and C entered into their partnership agreement to ascertain whether it could be said that Company B owned site

X.

Since the law in effect at the time of partnership formation governs the assessment of prior ownership and since fewer states had adopted versions of the UPA
prior to the most recent revision, there is a greater likelihood that application of
state law for determining prior ownership will yield inconsistent results than will
the use of current state law for determining current ownership. See id.; see also
Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273.
15. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273 (holding that state law and not federal
common law would apply).
16. See Derek Mohr, On The Application Of CERCLA To NoncorporateEntities: An
Analysis of the Redwing Decisions, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1157, 1163 (1997) (stating
"[a] significant aspect of the controversy surrounding CERCLA arises... from the
expansive judicial interpretation given it"). In fulfilling Congress' goal of making
responsible parties pay, an expansive interpretation has been made to give effect
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for achieving additional comprehensiveness in CERCLA, a federal
common law defining ownership may be the best alternate option.
II.

A.

CERCLA: GoALS,

LANGUAGE AND AMENDMENTS

A Description of CERCLA

CERCLA is a federal statute that provides regulations for environmental cleanups. 17 CERCILA not only supplies funding for
cleanups, but also provides a means for determining potential responsibility and ultimate liability for repayment of funds into CERCLA. 18 This system involves a bifurcated analysis: (1) whether an
to the Superfund's remedial purpose. See Watson, supra note 2, at 271-74 (discussing courts applying remedial purpose canon). Since most of this extension of liability has occurred without much intervention by Congress, CERCLA has been
described as much judicially created law as much as statutory law. See id. "Because
of the heavy influence of judicial interpretation and the apparent low probability
that Congress will clarify the law on its own, individual decisions can immediately
reshape the contours of CERCLA law." Mohr, supra, at 1159.
17. See CERCLA §§101-175, 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675 (1996). There are also
state statutes similar to CERCLA, which operate independently from CERCLA. See
Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating
"[m] ost states have their own counterparts to CERCLA and EPA and they share a
complementary interest with the United States in enforcement of laws like CERCLA that are used to remedy environmental contamination"). Some state provisions, however, are broader. See, e.g., M.G.L. c. 21E, §2 (defining "person" broader
than that of CERCLA which does not include, inter alia, trusts or agents). Thus,
while state statutes may vary a bit, most are quite similar to the Superfund in purpose and function. See generally ZygmuntJ.B. Plater, Robert H. Abrams & William
Goldfarb, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw and PoLicyi NATURE, LAw, and SOCIETY 259 (1992)
(discussing state versions of CERCLA). Court's have generally accepted that Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions
they created. See id.; see also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,
805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that CERCLA and similar state laws
seek to protect public health and environment by facilitating cleanup of environmental contamination and imposing costs on parties responsible for pollution); see
generally CERCLA §114(a), 42 U.S.C. §9614(a) (stating "[n]othing in this chapter
shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances
within such State"). Thus, States may enact legislation overlapping with the purpose of CERCLA but such statutes must contain identical terms or additional and
more stringent measures. See id.
18. See Oswald, supra note 11, at 224 (discussing CERCLA broadly). For a
further discussion of CERCLA's bifurcated liability structure, see infra notes 19-20
and accompanying text. A potentially responsible party is referred to in the short
hand as a "PRP." See id. They are deemed to merely be "potentially" responsible
because of the bifurcated nature of CERCLA liability. See id. Once a party is first
deemed to be a PRP, their liability is then determined under CERCLA's strict liability scheme. See id. For a discussion of CERCA's strict liability scheme, see infra
note 20 and accompanying text. For a discussion of multiple party liability and
cost allocation under CERCLA, see Superfund in the 106th Congress, 30 ENvr'L L.
RPTR. 10648 (August 2000).
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entity is responsible and (2) whether that entity is liable. 1 9 Because
CERCLA is a strict liability statute, once a party is classified as a
"potentially responsible party" ("PRP"), it is probable that ultimate
20

liability will follow.
In the sense that "comprehensive" can be understood to imply
"broad coverage," a quintessentially comprehensive statute would
19. See CERCLA §107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (4); see generally Oswald, supra
note 11, at 224. A plaintiff must prove the following to establish a prima facie case
of liability in a CERCLA action: (1) the site in question is a "facility" as defined in
42 U.S.C. §9601(9); (2) a release or a threatened release of a "hazardous substance" has occurred on the site; (3) the defendant is a responsible person under
42 U.S.C. §9607(a); and (4) the release or threatened release has caused the plaintiff to incur response costs. See Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal
Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1998) (using four-factor prima facie case); see
also ABB Indus. Sys. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 356 (2d Cir. 1997) (using
four-factor prima facie test); Klehr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal
Co., 14 F.3d 321, 325 (7th Cir. 1994) (pointing to four-prong approach needed to
constitute prima facie case); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th
Cir. 1989) (deciding matter at issue by employing four-point analysis to establish
prima facie case).
CERCLA has been interpreted to impose joint and several liability upon responsible parties. See Soo Line R. R. Co. v. B.J. Carney & Co., 797 F. Supp. 1472,
1486 (D. Minn. 1992) (stating that since both individuals and partners are statutorily defined as "persons" under CERCLA, both may be held jointly and severally
liable and "[a]s a general rule, CERCLA imposes joint and several liability upon
responsible persons except where they can show that the harm is divisible"); see also
United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D.
Miss. 1984) (holding that joint and several liability should be imposed under
CERCLA).
20. See generally United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (stating standard of strict liability was
appropriate under CERCLA). CERCLA does not specifically mention strict liability but courts have consistently interpreted this to be the standard of liability. See
Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 903 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D.R.I.
1995) (using strict liability standard); see also State ex rel. Howes v. W.R. Peele, Sr.
Trust, 876 F. Supp. 733, 736 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (applying strict liability standard);
Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir.
1989) (using strict liability standard); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atlantic
Research Corp., 847 F. Supp. 389, 395 (E.D. Va. 1994) (using strict liability standard); City of Phoenix, Arizona v. Garbage Serv. Co., 816 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D.
Ariz. 1993) (noting that "culpability has nothing to do with owner/operator liability under CERCLA"); Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837,
846 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating trigger to liability under §9607(a) (2) is ownership at
time of disposal, not culpability or responsibility for contamination); United States
v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating "[t]he traditional elements of tort culpability ... simply are absent from the statute").
Section 101 of CERCLA states that liability under CERCLA "shall be construed
to be the standard of liability which obtains under §311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act." CERCLA §101 (89), 42 U.S.C. §9601 (89). Despite the fact that
§311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA") does not clearly discuss strict liability, courts have interpreted the language of the FWPCA to include
strict liability because, unless a party asserts one of the specified defenses, they are
subject to such liability. See Zygmunt, supra note 17, at 264 (noting that Congress'
reference to FWPCA §311 makes sense because same defenses available in FWPCA
appear in §107 of CERCLA).
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be like the one provided for in CERCLA, under which nearly all
21
who are considered controlled by the statute are found liable.
While it is fairly uncontested that CERCLA's extensive liability
scheme is well within the purview of Congress' intent, the question
of how far to go in determining potential responsibility is much
more uncertain. 2 2 In pursuing Congress' intent, courts invariably
turn to the goals espoused within the legislative history of
2
CERCLA. 3
1. Congress' Goals, the Basis for Interpretation
One of the goals underlying CERCLA was to provide the federal government with the necessary tools to implement a prompt
and effective response to the problems resulting from hazardous
waste disposal. 24 An additional goal was to ensure that those responsible for the disposal of hazardous waste would be accountable
for their actions. 25 While CERCLA is to be broadly interpreted to
21. See Zygmunt, supranote 17, at 263 (discussing extensive reach of CERCIA
as strict liability statute).
22. See, e.g., Brian J. Pinkowski, FacilitativeGovernment: An Experiment in Federal
Restraint, 38 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 18 (1998) (blaming uncertainty surrounding
scope of potential responsibility under CERCLA for difficulty in developing property listed on National Priorities List).
23. See, e.g., Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menasha Corp., 2000 WL
1472718, at *6 (6th Cir. 2000) (looking to legislative history to interpret CERCLA's
liability standard under §107); Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. Cleveland, 72 F.
Supp.2d 1373, 1375 (M.D. Ga. 1999) (basing decision on language and structure
of CERCLA, its legislative history, and its broad remedial purpose). See generally
Alan Hanson, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: An Overview and Resolution of the Controversy Surrounding PrivatePRP Standing Under CERCLA Sections 107(A)(4)(B) and 113
(F)(1), 10 GEO. INT'L. ENVrL. L. REv. 199, 208-14 (1997) (noting significance of

legislative history when courts seek to pursue Congress' intent).
24. See generally Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Truck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662,
665 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that two primary goals of CERCLA are enabling EPA
to respond efficiently and expeditiously to toxic spills and holding those parties
responsible for releases liable for costs of cleanup); see also Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (discussing that
Congress' intent when passing CERCLA was to enable government to respond
quickly and efficiently to national problem of hazardous waste disposal). Congress
enacted CERCLA with the intent of "initiat[ing] and establish [ing] a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems
associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." H. RP.
No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125.
25. See H. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 15 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3038, 3038 (noting that Congress' goals in enacting CERCLA were: "(1) to provide
for clean-up if a hazardous substance is released into the environment or if such
release is threatened, and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of
these clean-ups"). These potentially responsible parties are referred to in the short
form as PRPs, standing for potentially responsible parties. See Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11 th Cir. 1990) (commenting on CERCLA's purposes, one of which was to ensure that PRPs are held respon-
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effectuate the goals for which it was established, the courts' interpretations of the statute must be supported either by the statute's
26
plain meaning or its legislative history.
2.

The Language of CERCLA

A party may not be held liable under CERCLA unless they are
first found potentially responsible, or "covered." 2 7 Once an entity is
found to be potentially responsible and classified as a PRP, it is covered by CERCLA. 28 There are four categories of PRPs. 29 If particusible); see also Watson, supra note 2, at 272-73 (arguing that remedial purpose
canon of judicial interpretation heavily influences the application of CERCLA).
The remedial purpose canon simply refers to lower courts' willingness to broadly
define terms of potential responsibility and ultimate liability under CERCLA based
on the perception that this furthers Congress' goal of holding responsible parties
responsible. See id. The effect of this liberal interpretation has lead to the current
situation in which one third of all cleanup sites involve more than one hundred
PRPs, and another third involves between twenty and one hundred PRPs. See S.
REP. No. 103-349, at 40-41 (1994).
26. See 3550 Stevens Creek Associates v. Barclays Bank of California, 915 F.2d
1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing remedial purpose of CERCLA and noting
need for broad interpretation of CERCLA but requiring construction of statute
not supported on statute's face and unsupported by legislative history); see also
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 255 (3d Cir. 1992) (construing CERCLA liberally).
The Supreme Court has also recognized that just because a situation appears
to be within the literal language of a statute does not mean that the statute should
necessarily be interpreted to include it. See George Schatzki, United Steelworkers of
America, v. Weber: An Exercise in UnderstandableIndecision, 56 WAsH. L. REv. 51, 66-67
(1980). The Court stated that courts must consider legislative history to pursue
Congress' intent behind the text of legislation. See id.
Courts must balance alternative interests when analyzing cases under CERCLA. See e.g. In reJensen, 995 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993). An example of the
need for a delicate median that can be accomplished by specific liability limiting
provisions is protecting public health on one hand by enacting broadly defined
potential responsibility provisions and simultaneously, assuring that only "responsible" parties are held liable. See id. (balancing competing interests of EPA policy
and individual rights in bankruptcy).
27. See United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (describing four categories of covered persons per §107 together as "PRPs"). Because
Superfund moneys are limited, CERCLA provides for recovery of costs from "responsible parties," as set out in §107. Id. at 892; see also CERCLA §107, 42 U.S.C.
§9607 (1982).
28. See Aaron Cooper, UnderstandingCausation and Threshold of Release in CERCLA Liability: The Difference Between Single- and Multi-Pollutor Contexts, 52 VAND. L.
REv. 1449, n.30 (1999) (stating that "[a] PRP is a party that falls within the category of a covered person, including any present or past owner of a hazardous waste
site, a party who has arranged for disposal of waste at the site, or a party who has
transferred waste to the site"); see also CERCLA §107 (a) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. §9607
(a) (1) (A) (1994).
29. See Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 893 (listing four categories of PRPs as: 1) current
owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities; 2) past owners and operators of
hazardous waste facilities; 3)persons who arranged for disposal of hazardous substances; and 4) transporters of hazardous substances).
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lar defendants are not within one of the categories, they will not be
liable for §107 cleanup costs.3 0 "This can be a multi-million dollar
issue in the case of extensive or hard-to-clean releases. 3 1 This
Comment deals only with categories one and two, present and past
"owners and operators" respectively, and further limits its discus3 2
sion to ownership involving on-shore facilities.
30. See Zygmunt, supra note 17, at 264 (discussing significance of PRP
question).
31. See id. (discussing significance of PRP question).
32. See CERCLA §107(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (1) (listing "owners and operators" as PRPs) (emphasis added). Because owners and operators are different
from each other and since prior owners are different from current owners, it is
appropriate to discuss owners while not discussing operators and to discuss prior
owners separately from current owners. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that current owners, even those who were
not "operators" of site at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance, were
liable under CERCLA). The word "and" has caused some discussion of whether
owners, not also being operators, can be potentially responsible. See id.; see also
Cadillac Fairview/California Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 14 ENVTL. L. INST. 20376
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that prior owners and operators are only liable if they
owned or operated facility "at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance").
See Shore Reality Corp., 759 F.2d at 1044. The court explained that Shore's reliance
on this holding was inappropriate because the Cadillac Fairview court was concerned with a prior owner and predicated its holding solely upon the words of
section 9607(a) (2). See id. Despite this feasible construction, it is generally accepted that an entity need not be both owner and operator to be held liable under
CERCLA. See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577-78
(D. Md. 1986) (analyzing meaning of use of word "and," stating that
"[n]otwithstanding the language "owner and operator", a party need not be both
an owner and operator to incur liability under this subsection"); see also Guidice v.
BFG Electroplating and Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding
that entity need not be both owner and operator to be liable under CERCLA);
Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280
(D. Del. 1987) (finding liability despite party not both owner and operator); Briggs
& Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Services, 29 F. Supp.2d 1372, 1378 (M.D. Ga.
1998) (finding defendant responsible as operator "based on his exercise of control" but not holding responsible as owner because "[o]perator liability under
CERCLA is not sufficient to establish the ownership of property"); Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d at 1550 (stating that creditor may incur §107(a) (2) liability without
being operator, by participating in financial management of facility to degree indicating capacity to influence corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes).
Unlike Category One PRPs, Category Two PRPs are described, in liability
terms, as any person who "owned or operated" any facility at the time of disposal of
any hazardous substance as a prior owner. See CERCLA §107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§9607(a)(2). Prior ownership alone is sufficient for holding a party potentially
responsible under CERCLA. See id. A party may be held liable as either an owner
or a prior owner, so it is not essential that the party be classifiable as an owner at
the time of litigation. See id. The PRP prior ownership classification holds parties
responsible under CERCLA whose interest in sites may have passed but who, nonetheless, could have been regarded as owners at the time of release of hazardous
substance. See id.
A party can be a Category One owner simultaneously to being a Category Two
prior owner. See id. In such cases, the party who is both owner and prior owner
will be no more or less liable than a party fitting only one classification. See id.
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The Non-Comprehensiveness of CERCLA as Originally
Enacted

Courts have struggled to define "owners and operators" according to the perceived intent of Congress because CERCLA lacks
settled statutory definitions. 33 Gaps and circular definitions pertaining both to potential responsibility and ultimate liability cause
confusion within CERCLA, rendering it subject to varying judicial
interpretations regarding the statute's underlying intent. 34 Thus,

Like current owners, prior owners will face strict liability once determined to be a
PRP. See id.
33. See CERCLA §101 (20) (A), 42 U.S.C. §9601(20) (A) (defining "owner" and
"operator" together at section 101 of CERCLA as follows: "[t]he term 'owner or
operator' means . . . in the case of an onshore facility or offshore facility, any
person owning or operating such facility"). CERCLA does not define the term any
further except that in subsection (D) of section 101, an exclusion is provided for
state or local governments who acquire property by virtue of its function as sovereigns, which neither cause nor contribute to the release or threatened release of
hazardous substance from the facility. See CERCLA §101 (20) (D) (providing exclusion to state or local government when site involuntarily acquired by virtue of its
function as sovereign).
Those courts which interpret CERCLA ownership broadly, base their conclusion on legislative history and concepts of statutory construction. See Philadelphia
v. Stephan Chem. Co., 1987 WL 15214, Civ. A. Nos. 81-0851, 83-5493 (E.D. Pa. July
30, 1987); 1 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY 4 (stating that when used without restriction in statutes, the term "owner" includes one who has use, control of occupation of land with claim of ownership of title or of some other estate or interest);
Tomme R. Young, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE: FORECLOSURE, WORKOUTS, PROCEDURES. Ch. 30B Environmental Concerns in Purchaseand Sale of Real Property, n.41; H.R. 85 as introduced May 15, 1979, 20 CERCLA Legislative History at
546.
34. See Allan J. Topol & Rebecca Snow, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.6
(1999) (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Development Corp.,
976 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating "[tihe circularity of [owner] renders it
useless")); see also Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, No. S-910760DFL/GGH,
1993 WL 217429 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 1993) (noting that circularity of definition of
owner has rendered definition useless); United States v. A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317, 1319 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that circularity of
definition "precludes its use as an interpretive device"); United States v. Petersen
Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (stating that CERCIA
does not define ownership, and that court would therefore look to the common
law) (citation omitted); Long Beach Unified School District v. Dorothy B. Godwin
California Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting circular definition of "'owner or operator' is as helpful as 'defining 'green' as 'green;'" and
looking to ordinary meanings of terms, and noting that 'owner' is distinct concept
from 'operator,' otherwise Congress would not have used two words")).
"Prior owner" is an example of a term defined circularly in CERCLA. The
statute's failure to describe what body of law to use in defining "owner" is an example of a gap causing inherent ambiguity in CERCLA. See supra notes 27-30 and
accompanying text.
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in the sense that CERCLA is not self-descriptive, it is somewhat noncomprehensive.

3 5

Prior to its recent amendments, CERCLA left many questions
pertaining to ultimate liability unanswered. 36 Specifically, it left
open the issue of whether fiduciaries could be held personally liable for the release or the threatened release of hazardous substances.3 7 Despite these unanswered questions, Congress has
attempted to clarify CERCLA by amending various sections of the
statute.3 8 Assessing Congress' success in achieving a truly compre-

hensive CERCIA turns on an understanding of Congress' goals re-

35. See Scott Wilsdon, When a Security Becomes a Liability: ClaimsAgainst Lenders
in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINCS L.J. 1261, 1263 n.17 (1987) (describing
CERCLA as having poor drafting, inconsistent provisions and vague terminology);
see also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823, 838 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (calling
CERCLA "a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and deleted provisions" which, almost invariably, places courts in the "undesirable and onerous position of construing inadequately drawn legislation");
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986)
(calling CERCLA a "hastily patched together compromise Act").
36. SeeJoseph M. Macchione, Lender Liability Under CERCLA in Light of the Asset
Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996: Does the Act
Spell Lender Relief or Continued Heartburn?, 16 TEMP. ENvrL. L. & TECH. J. 81, 82
(1997) (describing recent CERCLA amendment as "a potent dose of clarity" but,
nonetheless, noting CERCLA's continued ambiguity and vagueness).
37. See Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection
Act of 1996, PUB. L. No. 104-208, §2502, 110 Stat. 3009462, 3009462 (1996) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §9607(n)) (revealing that entities shall not be held
personally liable for decisions made within fiduciary capacity). Title 42 U.S.C.
§9607(n) (1) provides: "The liability of a Fiduciary under any provision of [CERCLA] for the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at, from, or in
connection with a vessel or facility held in a Fiduciary capacity shall not exceed the
assets held in the Fiduciary capacity." Id.
38. See id. at §§2502-05, 110 Stat. at 3009-462-69 (1996) (amending CERCLA).
The 1996 amendments to CERCLA [L]ender and [F]iduciary liability limitations
restricted [F] iduciary liability for the release of hazardous wastes to an entity's conduct as a [F] iduciary in its [F]iduciary capacity. See id. at §2502, 110 Stat. At 3009462-67 (1996) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §9607(n) (1997)). The amendments also modified a portion of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, defining "owner"
and "operator" for CERCLA purposes. See id. at §2503, 110 Stat. at 3009-468
(1996) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §69916(h) (9)).
"[T]he terms 'owner' and 'operator' do not include a person that, without
participating in the management of an underground storage tank and otherwise
not engaged in petroleum production, refining, or marketing, holds indicia of
ownership primarily to protect the person's security interest." Id. Further, the
1996 CERCLA amendments altered the Lender Liability Rule. See id. at §2504, 110
Stat. at 3009-468-69 (1996) (holding portion of final rule issued by EPA Administrator prescribing 40 C.F.R. §300.1105 shall be deemed validly issued under CERCLA of 1980 and effective according to terms of final rule). Finally, Congress
declared the 1996 CERCLA amendments applicable to any claim not finally adjudicated as of their enactment date. See id. at §2505, 110 Stat. at 3009-469 (1996).
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garding each piece of CERCLA legislation as well as CERCLA
39
generally.
C.

Amendments to CERCLA: Congress' Efforts to Improve the
"Comprehensiveness" of CERCLA
1.

The 1986 Amendments & ReauthorizationAct

Under The 1986 Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization
Act ("SARA"), Congress instituted a far-reaching set of amendments, re-authorizing the continued operation of the Superfund
system. 40 As one scholar noted, the "Reauthorization Act confirms
how everyone is liable.

'4 1

Thus, if comprehensiveness is under-

stood to mean "broad in scope," SARA may be characterized as a
significant step toward Congress' goal of achieving a comprehensive CERCLA program. 4 2 If comprehensiveness is defined by thoroughness, however, SARA may have been a failure. 43 SARA did very
39. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ann Glass, Superfund and SARA: Are There Any Defenses
Left?, 12 HARv. ENvmL. L. REv. 385 (1988) (discussing impact of 1986 Superfund
Amendments, culminating in Reauthorization Act amendments, upon CERCLA
litigation).
40. See id. at 390 (reporting that considerable congressional attention turned
toward amending and reauthorizing CERCLA in 1984 and 1985). Because the
substance of CERCLA was controversial, authorization to collect taxes to fund
CERCLA programs was scheduled to automatically expire on September 30, 1985.
See id. Thus, in 1984 and 1985, Congress turned its attention toward amending
and reauthorizing the Act. See id. In 1986, a conference committee examined the
divergent House and Senate reauthorization bills. See id. The conference committee finally passed a compromise bill in July, 1986. See id. While the two houses of
Congress agreed upon the substantive issues of the reauthorized bill, the two did
not agree on the finance provisions of the bill until October 2, 1986. See id. Despite Presidential threats to veto the imposition of a broad-based business tax to
fund the new CERCLA program, both the House and the Senate enacted the
reauthorized CERCLA bill by overwhelming margins. See id. On October 17, 1986,
President Ronald Regan signed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 ("SARA") into law. See id.
41. See id. (depicting courts' modern treatment of CERCLA as ultimately
holding nearly anyone characterized as PRP liable under CERCLA). Another commentator corroborated this point, describing a CERCLA trial as "requiring only
that the Justice Department lawyer stand up and recite: 'May it please the Court, I
represent the government and therefore I win'". Roger Mazulla, Superfund 1991:
How InsuranceFirms Can Help Clean up the Nation's Hazardous Waste, 4 Toxics L. REP.
685 (Nov. 8, 1989). If comprehensiveness is thus defined by the number of parties
held potentially responsible, SARA may be determined a colossal success. Glass,
supra note 39, at 390.
42. See id. at 461 (stating that "[o]perating in a zealous atmosphere, the EPA
has systematically sought the expansion of Superfund liability which the courts
have granted almost completely").
43. See generally Eric DeGroff, Raiders of the Lost Arco: Resolving the PartialSettlement Credit Issue in Private Cost Recovery and Contribution Claims Under CERCIA, 8
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 332, 333 (2000) (noting that CERCLA legislative history has
been variously criticized as vague, sparse, and self-contradictory) (citing United
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little to bridge the broad gaps or to clarify the circular definitions,
such as the meaning of "owned," in CERCLA. 44 In 1991, Douglas
M. Garrou, a CERCLA commentator, posed a hypothetical lawsuit
to illustrate some of the gaps remaining after SARA. 45 Given the
confusion illustrated in his hypothetical, Garrou appealed to Congress to clarify the meaning of CERCLA terms and to elucidate the
ambiguities in CERCLA liability provisions. 46 This would enable
courts to be better prepared to further the purposes of the statute.
While CERCLA was found to be somewhat more comprehensive

States v. Cordova Chemical Co., No. 92-2288/2326 (6th Cir. July 14, 1995); United
States v. Aceto Agr. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989); Dedham Water
Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1986); United States
v. A & N Cleaners and Launders, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); United
States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., No. 85-CV-73764 (E.D. Mich., May 4, 1989);
United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Del. 1986)).
44. See Garrou, supra note 3, at 130 (observing that SARA broadly defined
.contracts," but failed to clearly define other statutory terms such as "owned").
45. See id. at 117 (illustrating trustees' potential liability as owner under CERCLA through hypothetical lawsuit). Garrou's hypothetical lawsuit portrayed a situation where EPA attempted to hold a trustee liable as a current owner under
CERCLA for the clean up costs of a hazardous waste site. See id. at 117-18. Garrou
evaluated the extent to which the expertise and activities of the hypothetical trustee characterized her as a PRP. See id. at 120-21. He warned that the trustee would
have a difficult time determining the likelihood that she could be held ultimately
liable or even potentially responsible. See id. Garrou attributed the lack of clarity
to CERCLA's unclear language regarding the scope of fiduciary liability. See id. at
121.
Through his hypothetical, Garrou surmised that while CERCLA should be
construed broadly, innocent individuals should escape liability. See id. at 129 (outlining elements of innocent landowner defense). Similarly, Representative Barney
Frank has stated "[p]art of having a tough and comprehensive [CERCLA] program is having provisions that allow innocent individuals to be treated as innocent
individuals. In other words .... nothing is more damaging to a good regulatory
scheme than having anything in it that could inadvertently sweep out within its
coils innocent individuals." Id. at 113 (quoting 131 CONG. REc. HI1, 158 (daily ed.
Dec. 5, 1985) (statement of Rep. Frank)). Garrou concluded that:
[T]he courts, the legislature, and the potentially responsible trustee herself all may have an important role to play in a future attempt to hold a
trustee personally liable as a CERCLA owner. The ambiguity of the relevant CERCLA liability provisions and the paucity of congressional guidance will challenge a reviewing court in its attempt to further the
purposes of the statute. The legislature, meanwhile, is faced with important and far-reaching choices in its attempt to fine-tune the CERCLA statute; its decisions will affect the extent to which the CERCLA framework is
able to respond to its original goals.
Id. at 147-48.
46. See id. In other words, while Garrou challenged Congress to close some
gaps and expand some definitions within the Superfund statute for the sake of
improving the statute's clarity, he affirmed that SARA was successful in making
CERCLA more comprehensive in the sense that it provided for broader liability.
See id. at 129-30.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss1/4

14

2001]

Holly: Potential ResponsibilityCANADYNE
under CERCLA: Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v.

than it formerly was, the statute continued to lack clarity and failed
47
to be truly comprehensive.
2.

The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit
Insurance Protection Act of 1996

The most recent amendments to CERCLA, enacted as Subtitle
E of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, are entitled
"The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance
Protection Act of 1996" ("ACA"). 48 ACA significantly added to
CERCLA by providing trustees and other fiduciaries with protection
from personal liability beyond personal assets held in their respective capacities. 49 This amounted to a significant declaration of Con47. See G. Van Velsor Wolf, Jr., The Impact of EnvironmentalLaw on Real Estate
and Other Commercial Transactions,Lenders, Trustees and Bankruptcy, SD21 ALI-ABA
573, 576-77 (1998) (discussing continued lack of clarity of CERCLA). Wolf specifically discussed the Fleet Factors,stating that " [t] he danger of Fleet Factorswas that a
subsequent court could use the language aggressively or less carefully than the
author may have intended." Id. In short, CERCLA remained unclear and despite
judicial guidance giving CERCLA's clauses additional meaning, courts continue to
have room to diverge in interpreting the Statute. See id.
The issue in Fleet Factors was whether the lender's "involvement [was] sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous waste decisions if it chose." Id. A divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that a secured creditor may incur liability "without being an operator,
by participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a
capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes." Id. The
Eleventh Circuit continued, stating "[i]t is not necessary for the secured creditor
actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be
liable .. ." Id.

48. Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection,
L. No. 104-208, §§2501-2505, 110 Stat. at 3009-462-469 (1996), codified at 42
U.S.C. §§9601(2), 9607(n), 6991(b) (h) (9).
49. See CERCLA §107(n) (5) (A) (i) (I-XI), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n) (5) (A) (i) (I-XI)
(including as "fiduciaries" the following, as well as any representative in any other
capacity that Administrator determines to be similar to: trustees, executors, administrators, custodians, guardians of estates or guardians ad litem, receivers, conservators, committee of estates of incapacitated persons, personal representatives,
or trustees (including successors to trustees) under indenture agreements, trust
agreements, leases, or similar financial agreements).
Subsection (n) of CERCLA §107 does not provide a defense to liability but
statutorily limits liability of fiduciaries. See CERCLA § 107(n), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n).
Thus, the nature of one's relationship to a site, although a party may be found to
be a PRP, may allow a defense to become available to limit or remove liability. See
id. For a discussion of the bifurcated liability system employed in CERCLA, see
supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Where the decedent would be liable
were he alive, the plaintiff should be allowed to look to the decedent's assets, in
the hands of the estate or the estates beneficiaries, to satisfy that liability. This is
referred to as a trust fund theory. See Steego Corp. v. Ravenal, 830 F. Supp. 42, 49
(D. Mass. 1993) (applying trust fund theory to trust as well as corporation) (citing
Soo Line R.R., Co. v. B.J. Carney & Co., 797 F. Supp. at 1484-85) (allowing a claim
against estate beneficiaries and certain testamentary trusts of the deceased former
president of a polluting corporation). The beneficiary is deemed to hold the asPUB.
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gress' intent with respect to the issue of personal liability. 5 0 In sum,
sets received from a liable party's estate in trust for the benefit of satisfying liabilities of a deceased, responsible person. See Soo Line R.R, 797 F. Supp. at 1484-85.
50. Compare City of Phoenix, 816 F. Supp. at 600 (holding that trustee is
"owner" under CERCLA even though it may only hold bare legal title and liability
for cleanup may far exceed value of trust's assets) with United States v. Mirabile, 15
ENVrL. L. REP. 20994, 20996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (holding that bank was exempt as inactive security interest holder under §101 (20) (a)). In Mirabile,the court
concludes that possession of title was not dispositive evidence of ownership. See id.
at 20994. In sum, ACA is a significant declaration of Congress' intent with respect
to personal liability because decisions made prior to adoption of ACA would come
out differently under CERCLA containing ACA provisions.
Prior to adoption of ACA, many courts found trustees personally liable for the
cleanup of sites. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Better Brite Plating, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 574,
579 (Wis. 1992) (dismissing for lack ofjurisdiction case in which circuit court and
appeals court had found trustee of bankrupt trust personally liable for cleanup of
site). In contrast, other courts limited fiduciary liability. See, e.g., United States v.
Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (holding that statutory trustees were
liable in capacity as trustees, but only to extent of corporate property and effects
which came into their hands). The difference in judicial treatment was primarily
accounted for by the courts' variable treatment of control as an element of determining ownership. See id. at 1306.
Control has not been a relevant factor to finding ownership for all courts but
has clearly been important to some. See, e.g., Kelley v. Thomas-Solvent, 727 F.
Supp. 1532, 1543-44 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that since trustee had "authority
to control" waste-handling practices and prevent hazardous waste damage, trustee
could have CERCIA liability); see also United States v. Pesses, 794 F. Supp. 151, 155
(W.D. Pa. 1998) (exempting savings and loan from CERCLA liability where it did
not participate in management of facility and merely held title to property as security for loan); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1276 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (holding that defendant would not be liable as owner if co-defendant
put defendant's name on deed without his knowledge or consent, and defendant
continued to be ignorant of fact that his name was on deed, but took action as
soon as he found that his name was on deed). See generally John M. Scagnelli,
Acquiring or Selling the Privately Held Company: EnvironmentalIssues and Liability Considerations, 1125 PLI/CoRP 703, 709-10 (1999).
A court deciding a case like City of Phoenix today, however, would be bound by
CERCLA to limit contribution to assets held in the trustee's fiduciary capacity, irrespective of any finding of control. See CERCLA §107(n), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n). As a
result, even a fiduciary who engages in certain activities traditionally associated
with control will be subject to limited liability. See id.
In general, subsection (n) (1) is subject to qualifying provisions. See CERCLA
§107(n) (2), (4), (5). Subsection (n)(2) states that "[p]aragraph (1) does not apply to the extent that a person is liable under this Act independently of the person's ownership of a vessel
or facility as a fiduciary or actions taken in a fiduciary
capacity." CERCLA §1 0 7(n)(2), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n)(2). Section (n) will be invoked by a defendant who has been found to be otherwise liable under CERCLA
(e.g., an "owner"). Section (n) (2) prevents use of this limitation for activities
taken by a fiduciary independently of the person's ownership as a fiduciary or actions taken in a fiduciary capacity. See id. Thus, a defendant cannot avoid personal
liability solely because he can be characterized as a fiduciary. See id. A person may
still be personally liable if his involvement with the site in question extends beyond
functions required as fiduciary. See id.
Activities which do not expand liability beyond those held in the fiduciary
capacity include: covenants, warranties, or other provisions concerning environmental compliance in the fiduciary documentation; monitoring or enforcing provisions of those documents; inspecting the facility; providing financial or other
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while Congress intended ACA to make CERCLA more self-descriptive, ultimately, ACA proved to be a significant, but incomplete
step.

51

Although ACA was a positive step toward clarifying Congressional intent with respect to fiduciary liability, ambiguities continue
to confound the clarity of CERCLA, particularly subsection (n).52
Additionally, while ACA has elucidated Congress' intent with readvice to the parties; restructuring the relationship; terminating the relationship;
administering a facility that was contaminated before the relationship began; or
conducting a response action under CERCLA or otherwise at the direction of the
EPA. See CERCLA §107(n) (4) (A-I), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n) (4) (A-I).
51. See generally Marc L. Fleischaker & Lawrence E. Blatnik, THE LAW OF DisTRESSED REAL ESTATE: FORECLOSURE, WORKOUTS, PROCEDURES

§30.04 (1999) (dis-

cussing utility of ACA); Lisa G. Dwyer, Relief From CERCLA 's 'Rock and a Hard Place:
The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act, 3 ENvrL.
LAW. 859 (1998) (explaining ACA particularly in context of lender liability); Macchione, supra note 36, at 81 (discussing impact of ACA).
In short, ACA clarified fiduciary liability under CERCLA, making CERCLA
more self-descriptive. See CERCLA §107(n) (4) (A-I), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n) (4) (A-I).
By simply reading the statute, courts can now confidently know the extent of fiduciaries' liability. See id. Nonetheless, CERCLA remains incomplete because gaps
and circular definitions remain. See Garrou, supra note 3, at 130 (noting circular
definitions and gaps replete in CERCLA).
52. See, e.g., Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1275-76 (discussing what may be required
to show negligence in §(n) of CERCLA). The Eleventh Circuit required supplemental briefs filed on the matter of defining the meaning of negligence. See id.
The court was specifically concerned with whether the failure to act could amount
to negligence as meant by subsection (n). See id. The court ultimately held that
"[h]ere, the negligence exception requires some action because the Bank had no
duty to prevent someone else from releasing hazardous substances." Id. at 1275.
The Eleventh Circuit did not dismiss the claim for want of proof of negligence
but the court noted that "we merely state that the complaint satisfies the very low
threshold of sufficiency prescribed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure..." Id.
at 1276. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[w]e are compelled by precedent to hold that '[i]t is sufficient against a motion to dismiss to allege that
defendant acted negligently.'" Id. (quoting Augusta Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 170 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1948)). The Eleventh Circuit is the first to have
interpreted ACA and Congress' meaning of negligence. See id. at 1275. While a
full discussion of this aspect of ACA is beyond the scope of this Comment, the
case's significance as an opinion analyzing the meaning of negligence on first impression is worth noting. See id. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit's difficulty in determining the meaning of negligence emphasizes the point that both the
amendment and CERCIA remain non-comprehensive as far as self-description is
concerned. See id.
The Eleventh Circuit stressed that "[t]he Bank will have an opportunity to
move for summary judgment at the appropriate time." Id. The Eleventh Circuit
also advised that "simply because [the plaintiff's] complaint surviv[ed] a motion to
dismiss does not authorize [the plaintiff] to engage in wholesale discover[y]" but
rather that "the district court may limit discovery to determining whether the [defendant], through its negligent action, caused or contributed to release of hazardous
substances at the cite." Id. (citing CERCLA §107(n) (3), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n) (3))
(emphasis added); see also William W. Buzbee, CERCLA 's New Safe Harborsfor Banks,
Lenders, and Fiduciaries, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10656 (1996) (discussing ACA and
describing it as "the first significant amendment to CERCLA in a decade").
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spect to fiduciary liability, it has done little to define the terms that
establish potential responsibility under the statute. 53 Nevertheless,
ACA may have indirectly succeeded in broadening the scope of
CERCLA responsibility through the Eleventh Circuit's expanded in54
terpretation and application of ACA in cases like Canadyne.
Whether the term "comprehensive" is understood to mean self-descriptive or broad in scope, as a general proposition, Congress
55
achieved comprehensiveness through ACA.

In summary, if the PRP is a trustee, there is a presumption that liability will be
limited to assets held in the party's fiduciary capacity. See id. This exception, however, is subject to exclusion and limitation clauses in addition to express exemptions of CERCLA. See CERCLA §107(n), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n). A fiduciary may be
personally liable even if he is acting in a fiduciary capacity. See CERCLA
§107(n) (3), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n)(3) (stating that liability is not limited if "negligence of a fiduciary causes or contributes to the release or threatened release").
53. See CERCLA §107(n), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n). The Act does not change the
definitions of owner or operator but does define what is meant by "participating in
the management." See CERCLA §101(20)(A)(ii); 42 U.S.C. §9601(20)(A)(ii).
Owner or operator is defined in section 101 of CERCLA as: "in the case of an
onshore facility .. , any person owning or operating such facility ....
[S]uch term
does not include a person who, without participating in the management of a...
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the
... facility." Id. Following enactment of ACA, in revised section 101 (20) of CERCLA, the term "participate in management" means actually participating in the
management or operational affairs of a vessel or facility; and does not include
merely having the capacity to influence, or the un-exercised right to control, vessel
or facility operations. See id. This revision does little to define owner or operator.
54. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d 1269. The Canadyne court, among others, has interpreted CERCLA provisions in reaching their conclusions. See id.; see also Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d 1489. It is not always clear, however, that these conclusions
are consistent with Congress' intent. See generally United States v. USX Corp, 68
F.3d 811, 822 (3d Cir. 1995) (looking at statutory basis to support conclusion
reached by court but noting difficulty in surmising Congress' intent with regards to
CERCLA). Nonetheless, Congress' failure to legislatively correct erroneous or undesirable judicial interpretations of CERCLA, which operate against the legislatures' intent, could be construed as tantamount to Congress affirming the judicial
interpretation as adequately stating Congress' intent. See generally Robin C.
Tureworthy, Retroactive Application of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996 to Pending Cases: Rewriting a Poorly Written CongressionalStatute, 75 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1707, 1730-31 (1997) (generally discussing process of interpreting Congress'
silence). To criticize the judicial interpretation of ACA as broadening the scope of
CERCLA liability is akin to criticizing Congress' acquiescence and arguably akin to
criticizing Congress for the policy it ostensibly adopts as underlying ACA. Seegenerally id. Nonetheless, since Congress has not expressly adopted judicial interpretations, it reserves the ability to enact legislation without needing to reverse itself in
the process. See id. at 1733-34. The issue of whether to use state or federal law in
defining "own" and "owned" certainly qualifies as a victim of Congress' silent treatment. Courts seeking to apply ACA, coupled with other courts' interpretations of
ACA, must individually answer the question of whether judicial interpretation of
ACA, operates against Congress' intent. See id.
55. See CERCLA §107(n), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n). The ACA can be perceived as
achieving comprehensiveness in the sense of textual completeness in that CERCLA
now addresses fiduciary personal liability. See id. Following the enactment of ACA,
CERCLA is perceived as broader in scope because courts such as the Canadyne

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss1/4

18

2001]

Holly: Potential Responsibility under CERCLA: Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v.
CANADYNE

Given the significance of ACA, and despite prior congressional
debate on the issues underlying the Act, ACA experienced extremely limited congressional review prior to its adoption. 56 Moreover, it was inconspicuously presented on fewer than ten pages
within the voluminous Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act,
which dealt primarily with defense appropriations. 57 Scholars questioned Congress' motive and duly noted the inherent difficulty in
ascertaining Congress' intent due to the sparse debate contained in
the record. 58 As a result, it is not surprising if interpretive errors
have been made by the courts.

court tend to find more parties potentially responsible, believing that particular
provisions will vindicate those whom Congress does not wish to be held liable. See
Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273-76. See generally Dwyer, supra, note 51, at 873 (stating
that "[t]he purported goal of the Act, therefore, was to "fill the void in an unsettled area of law") (citing Lender Liability Rule, 57 FED. REG. 18.373 and Lender
Liability Act § 2502(b), 110 Stat. 3009-464 to -466, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§9601(20)(E), (F)). Dwyer concluded that "[b]ecause the Act adopts the Rule's
interpretation of the Secured Creditor Exemption, it is proper to assume that this
was also a goal of the Act." Id. at n.131. Courts like the Canadynecourt reason that
if Congress did not like the reach of potential responsibility, they would fill the gap
and provide express limitations. See id.
56. See Buzbee, supra note 52, at 10656 (citing Telephone Interview with
Randy Deitz, EPA Legislative Superfund Counsel, Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs (Oct. 18, 1996)) (stating "[t] he amendments were passed with little
contemporaneous public debate or discussion and, in fact, were generated out of
congressional banking committees, instead of the usual environment committees
and subcommittees"). Buzbee also notes the paucity of legislative discussion pertaining to Subtitle E prior to its integration with the 1996 Omnibus Appropriations
Act. See id. (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-863 on H.R. 3610, 104th Cong., 2d
Sess., 142 CONG. REC. H11644, (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996)).
There are similar criticisms of CERCLA itself. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative
History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
("Superfund') Act of 1980, 8 COLUM..J. ENVrL. L. 1, 1 (1980) (stating that paucity of
useful legislative history further complicates task of interpreting CERCLA); see also
Brian 0. Dolan, Misconceptions of ContractualIndemnification Against CERCLA Liability: Judicial Abrogation of the Freedom to Contract, 42 CATH. U.L. REv. 179, 179-82
(1992) (stating that CERCLA was enacted by "a 'lame duck' Congress, partially in
response to inadequacy of existing hazardous substance laws").
57. See Buzbee, supra note 52, at 10656.
58. See id. (citing 142 CONG. REc. S11919, S11920-21 (daily ed. Sept. 30,
1996)) (statement of Sen. D'Amato)) (stating that public or environmental groups
usually involved in drafting and review of environmental laws were "notably absent" from list of participants in legislative process). Senator D'Amato had discussed ACA on the day the amendments were enacted, stating that new provisions
"were the result of extensive negotiations among the administration, the lending
industry and the interested committees of both Houses." 142 CONG. REc. S11919

(daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. D'Amato).
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF POTENTIAL
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER

CERCLA

Lacking clear statutory language defining CERCLA terms or
helpful legislative history or amendments, courts have consistently
looked to judicially crafted common law to determine Congress' intent. 59 The resolution of Canadyneillustrated this point, presenting
an issue of potential responsibility similar to that discussed in Garrou's hypothetical lawsuit. 60 Unlike Garrou's hypothetical court,
61
however, the Eleventh Circuit was guided by ACA.
Despite Congress' minor success in increasing the sef-descriptiveness of CERCLA through ACA, CERCLA's definition of "ownership" remained ambiguous. 6 2 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit
relied on judicial precedent to interpret the meaning of "owned"
within the context of CERCLA. 63 Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit
relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Bestfoods, confirming that
state law, as opposed to a common federal law which, if created,
would preempt state law, could be used in defining the term. 64 The
phrasing of the Supreme Court's holding was permissive. 6 5 As a
result, it became incumbent upon each circuit to apply a common
federal rule or state law for determining the rules for ascribing
ownership.

59. See Grad, supra note 56, at 1 (discussing how courts pursue Congress' intent underlying CERCLA).
60. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269. Canadyne is an Eleventh Circuit case decided in the summer of 1999 involving a trustee whose trust was a general partner
in a limited partnership owning polluted land. See id. As discussed below, it is not
clear the extent state law played at the time of the release of hazardous substances
(hereinafter "historical state case law"). Compare Canadyne, 982 F. Supp. at 888-89
(applying state common law), with Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1272-73 (applying state
statutory law but not clearly incorporating state common law).
61. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273-74 (noting that ACA had already been enacted prior to this case). For a discussion of ACA, see supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text. Thus to the extent that ACA provided increased comprehensiveness
to CERCLA, the Eleventh Circuit was better off than was Garrou's hypothetical
court, because of the fact that ACA was enacted prior to the Eleventh Circuit's
decision. See id.
62. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1275 n.10 (discussing continuing ambiguity in
discerning meaning of words used in CERCLA).
63. See id. at 1273 (noting that whether defendant can be deemed "owner"
under CERCLA depends on application of state law, therefore, conclusions may
vary from state to state).
64. See id. at 1272 n.4 (discussing and applying Bestfoods).
65. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 51 (1998) (stating courts may
apply state law).
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Following Eleventh Circuit precedent established in Redwing
Carriers,Inc. v. SaralandApartments, Ltd.,6 6 which held that state law
rather than federal law would apply when ascertaining ownership
for CERCLA purposes, the Eleventh Circuit applied Georgia state
law.6 7 There is some question, however, as to whether the Eleventh

Circuit's decision in Canadyne, to apply state law to determine prior
ownership, is as sound as the Eleventh Circuit's same decision in
Redwing Carriers.6 8 The answer to this question hinges on the Eleventh Circuit's use of United States v. Kimbell Foods.69
A.

Kimbell Foods

In the 1979 Kimbell Foods decision, the Supreme Court addressed the circumstances in which it would be necessary to adopt a
federal common law, preempting state law in cases dealing with federal statutes. 70 In Kimbell Foods, a private lien holder brought suit to
66. 94 F.3d 1489 (11 th Cir. 1996) (describing how owner of property responsible for clean-up costs under CERCLA brought actions against general and limited partners of current owner, contractor which built apartment complex, and
managing agent of complex).
67. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, Ltd., 875 F. Supp. 1545
(S.D. Ala. 1995), affd in part and rev'd in part, 94 F.3d 1489.
68. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269, 1273 n.5. The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning used in Canadyne,like MarylandBank & Trust Co., is generally not clear because
it fails to provide a sufficient analytical structure for deciding prior ownership cases
similar to the situation presented in Canadyne. See id.; see also United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 577-78 (D. Md. 1986). Canadynespecifically lacks clarity because it fails to describe the role of state case law in
determining prior ownership. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269, 1272. While the
Canadyne Court may have achieved the right result, it, nonetheless, based its reasoning on superficial reasoning, and, thus, like Maryland Bank and Trust Co., is too
contorted to be the authoritative precedent for determining prior ownership for
partners. See Wolf, supranote 47, at 576 (discussing criticisms of Maryland Bank &
Trust). Whether or not the Eleventh Circuit reached "the right result" obviously
turns on how the Eleventh Circuit reached its conclusion (e.g., whether the court
overstepped the bounds of its role in procedure) and how one defines "right."
Assuming arguendo that the Eleventh Circuit reached "the right result," in that its
decision was legally sound, it still is arguable that its result is not necessarily the
best result. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1274 n.7 (admitting result was "anachronistic"). Not only does the Canadyne rule lead to an "anachronistic" result, but its
superficial reasoning opens the door to assaults on CERCLA's strict liability
scheme. See Canadyne, 982 F. Supp. at 890 (applying state law in manner which
considered element of control when determining ownership). Since Congress intends for CERCLA to be a strict liability statute, an impermissible rule would be
one exempting from liability parties otherwise considered PRPs due to a lack of
control. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th Cir.
1990) (stating standard of strict liability appropriate under CERCLA).
69. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
70. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (holding
that although federal law governs priority of liens stemming from federal lending
programs, uniform national rule unnecessary to protect federal interests underlying Small Business Administration and FHA loan program).
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foreclose on personal property in which the United States also
claimed an interest resulting from a lien on a federal guaranteed
loan. 71 In resolving this case, the Supreme Court held that: (1)
federal law governs the priority of liens stemming from federal
lending programs; (2) a uniform national rule was unnecessary to
protect the federal interests underlying the Small Business Administration and the Federal Housing Authority's loan programs, and
(3) the relative priority of private liens and consensual liens arising
from the federal loan programs was to be determined under nondiscriminatory state laws, absent a congressional directive to the
72
contrary.
In the Kimbell Foods opinion, Justice Marshall indicated that
federal courts should consider three factors when deciding whether
to craft a uniform Federal common law rule or, in the alternative,
adopt an applicable state law rule as the federal standard. 73 Specifically, the federal courts must consider: (1) the extent to which
there is a need for a nationally uniform body of law; (2) whether
application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs; and (3) the extent to which application of a federal
rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state
law.7 4 With regards to a CERCLA prior ownership case, no court
has specifically applied the Kimbell Foods test for determining

71. See id. (attempting to specifically resolve question "whether contractual
liens arising from certain federal loan programs take precedence over private
liens, absent a federal statute that sets priorities").
72. See id. (rendering decision which considered facts such as uniformity and
determinations of whether state law would frustrate specific objectives of federal
program).
73. See id. at 727-28 (stating that controversies governed by federal law "do not
inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules"). The Supreme Court, however,
did note that the adoption of federal law is sometimes appropriate. See id. at 728
(quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310 (1947)) (stating that
"[w]hether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of
judicial policy 'dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the
nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them of applying state law'"); see also David E. Dopf, FederalCommon Law or State Law, 10 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 171 (1999) (discussing whether courts should adopt common federal
law in context of successor liability under CERCLA).
74. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727-29 (noting considerations federal courts
must take into account in order to decide whether to create uniform common law
rule, or to adopt applicable state rule as federal standard); see also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts. Ltd., 94 F.3d 1489, 1501 (11th Circuit 1996) (stating that
it is necessary to apply Kimbell Foods test to issue of whether federal common law or
state law should govern when limited partner can be held accountable for CERCIA liability of partnerships).
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whether to use state versus federal law. The Eleventh Circuit, how75
ever, has applied Kimbell Foods in similar ways.
B.

Redwing Carriers

In Redwing Carriers the Eleventh Circuit applied the Kimbell
Foods test, holding that "CERCLA does not require that federal law
displace state laws governing the liability of limited partners unless
these laws permit action prohibited by the Act, or unless their application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the
cause of action.

'7 6

Essentially, Redwing Carriersaffirmed that in the

Eleventh Circuit, partnership issues under CERCLA would be de77
cided by state law.

Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held that limited partners in a
partnership owning an apartment complex were not owners for
purposes of liability under §107(a) of CERCLA because the limited
partners' interest was personal property. 78 In this case, the original
owner, who had been determined to be responsible for cleanup
costs under CERCLA, brought actions against both general and limited partners of the current owner, the contractor who built the
apartment complex, and the managing agent of the complex. 79 Although the limited partners were permitted to share the profits and
losses, receive distributions of assets and obtain income, gain, loss,
deduction, credit or similar items, the Redwing Carrierscourt noted
that limited partners do not, by virtue of being limited partners,
own what the limited partnership owns.80 The Eleventh Circuit rec75. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1489 (applying Kimbell Foods to current partnership issue under CERCLA and deciding that state law would govern).
76. Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1502 (internal quotations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit further held that only in the absence of "any unique definition of

'ownership' in CERCLA, we look to [state] law to define the ownership interest of
the limited partnership." Id. at 1498. The Eleventh Circuit was also concerned
that adoption of a federal standard would upset the expectations of investors. See
id. at 1502 (stating "[g]iven the popularity of the limited partnership structure as a
means of organizing businesses and attracting investment in this country, we hesitate to upset the expectations investors have under current state law rules by adopting a federal common law rule").
77. See id. at 1502 (noting that Kimbell Foods factors weigh against crafting

common law rule). Specifically, the court stated that "federal law governing liability under CERCLA should incorporate the applicable state law rule for determining when a limited partner looses its limited liability status so as to become
accountable for the CERCLA liability of the partnership". Id.
78. See id. at 1498.
79. See id. at 1489 (noting supplementary background information regarding
parties involved).
80. See id. at 1498 (citing CERCLA §107(a), 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)). In Redwing
Carriers, the court held that exercising rights was an essential element to finding
"ownership" for limited partners under CERCLA - merely possessing the right to
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ognized a difference between general and limited partners but "did
not express an opinion concerning the ruling of the lower court
that the general partners were not responsible parties within the
meaning of section 107(a)."8 1 Instead, they found that the lower

court had been correct in ruling that the third party defense of
82
section 107(b) (3) shielded the general partners from liability.

Thus, while it appears that the Eleventh Circuit treats general and
limited partners differently with regard to CERCLA ownership status, the extent of that difference is not clear.
Redwing Carriers is central to an analysis of Canadyne because
the Eleventh Circuit set a precedent for itself, holding that state
law, rather than federal law, would be used in resolving ownership
questions under CERCLA.8 3 Based on the Kimbell Foods test, the
Eleventh Circuit was convinced that there was no need for a common federal rule under this test because: 1) state limited partnership law was substantially uniform; 2) applying liability to limited
partners who took too many control actions was adequate to meet
CERCLA's goal of making the polluter accountable; and 3) the
problem with creating a federal common law was that it is the very
concept of limited liability that attracts investors to limited partnerships.8 4 In the end, investors' expectations are upset if a federal
85
common law applies instead of a defining state statute.

control important decisions in partnership's business was not enough. See id. at
1503. The court in Redwing Carriers, interpreted state law to determine whether
limited partners could be "owners" under CERCLA because CERCLA did not provide a unique definition of the term. See id. at 1498.
81. Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1498. The court did, however, state that while
a limited partner is not generally liable for obligations of partnership, exceptions
could arise when the limited partner acts like general partner in controlling a
partnership's business. See id. at 1502. While this statement makes clear that the
Eleventh Circuit stands ready to hold a limited partner liable, it does not necessarily suggest it will always hold a general partner liable. Controlling business seems
to be the Court's primary concern. See id. at 1499-1502.
82. See id. (finding that third party defense of section 107(b) (3) shielded general partners from liability).
83. See id. (concluding in case similar to Canadyne that state law, rather than
federal law, would be used in resolving ownership questions under CERCLA).
84. See id. (adopting Kimbell Foods to CERCLA ownership question and forming coherent test where ownership involves partnership).
85. See Redwing Cariers,94 F.3d at 1500-02. With regard to investors' expectations, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "[g]iven the popularity of the limited partnership structure as a means of organizing businesses and attracting investment in
this country, we hesitate to upset the expectations investors have under current
state law rules by adopting a federal common law rule." Id. at 1502.
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Bestfoods

In 1998, the Supreme Court in Bestfoods upheld the use of state
law to define "ownership" under CERCLA. 86 The Court determined that in the absence of a specific definition of "owner" in the
statute, the ordinary meaning is to be used in the place of any unusual or technical meaning. 8 7 The "ordinary" meaning of "owner,"
however, varies from state to state because "owner" carries legal im88
plications such as CERCLA liability.

The Supreme Court interpreted Congress' silence, with respect
to defining "owner," to mean that ownership could be determined
on a case-by-case basis according to state law. 89 In the wake of

Bestfoods, courts have reasonably interpreted Congress' silence to be
an endorsement of the liberty granted by the Supreme Court to
86. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 (stating in context of prior ownership "[iun
order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must speak direcdy to the
question addressed by the common law") (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S.
529, 534 (1993)). The Supreme court has not ruled on the issue of what body of
law must be used when determining prior ownership. See id. The Supreme Court
has, however, held that state common law may be used to fill in CERCLA's gaps.
See id. at 62. Because use of state law is permissive, rather than mandatory, it is
reasonable that a common federal law may be appropriate in instances where Kimbell Foods counsels in favor of such a rule.
87. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 (holding that "[n]othing in CERCLA purports
to rewrite . . .well settled rule[s]" established in state case law).

88. See Blyth, supra note 4, at 119 (comparing ownership laws of states).
89. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 (stating "CERCLA's failure to speak to a matter
as fundamental as the liability implications of corporate ownership demands application of the rule that, to abrogate a common-law principle, a statute must speak
direcdy to the question addressed by the common law") (citation omitted). In
Bestfoods, the Supreme Court was deciding a "conflict among the Circuits over the
extent to which parent corporations may be held liable under CERCLA for operating facilities ostensibly under the control of their subsidiaries." Id. at 60.
Like veil piercing, the rules for ownership are not clearly spelled out in CERCLA. See id. at 56 (citing CERCLA §101(2)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. §9601(2)(A)(ii))
(stating "[t ] he phrase "owner or operator" is defined only by tautology, however,
as 'any person owning or operating' a facility"). The Supreme Court stated that "it
is this bit of circularity that prompts our review." Id. Specifically, the Supreme
Court dealt with prior operator liability. The Supreme Court, however, specifically
stated that they were not ruling over whether, in enforcing CERCLA's indirect
liability, courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal common law.
See id. at 63-64 n.9. Although Bestfoods involved the common law of veil piercing,
subsequent cases have read the Court's holding beyond that context. See, e.g.,
Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d 1489 (citing Bestfoods in support of conclusion that state law
should apply in situation not involving veil piercing).
As stated above, a prior owner is not necessarily a current owner. It is possible
that state laws for ownership will change over time, as they have in the past. See,
e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of Georgia's New PartnershipLaw, 36 MERCER L.
REv. 443 (1985) (comparing current Georgia law to prior Georgia law and UPA).
It is not clear from Bestfoods whether courts are to use current state law or historical
state law for assessing prior ownership in cases where state law conflicts with itself.
See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 51.
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interpret "owner" under state law. 90 The Eleventh Circuit has not
only embraced this liberty but, as in Canadyne, employed it in such a
way described by the Court as "anachronistic." 91
IV.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RULE IN CANADYNE

Following Congress' enactment of ACA and the Supreme
Court's ruling in Bestfoods, the Eleventh Circuit revisited the state
versus federal choice-of-law issue. 9 2 In short, Canadyne asked the
Eleventh Circuit whether NationsBank could properly be construed
as a prior owner under §107(a) (2) as a person who owned or operated the site in question when the disposal of hazardous substances
93
occurred.
Although this issue was not new to the Eleventh Circuit, it was
slightly different. 9 4 Unlike Redwing Carriers, the primary issue in
Canadynewas ownership status, as opposed to operator status. 9 5 Despite this difference, the Eleventh Circuit held that state law should
apply. 96 The issue to be discussed in analyzing the propriety of the
Eleventh Circuit's decision is whether prior ownership, which was at
issue in Canadyne, is sufficiently different from the operator status
presented in Bestfoods, to require a full-blown Kimbell Foods analysis
in adopting its rule. 97 The answer to this question is "no" if the
90. See Bestfoods 524 U.S. at 62 (stating "[s]ilence is the most eloquent, for
such reticence while contemplating an important and controversial change in existing law is unlikely") (citing Edmonds v. Campaigne Generale Transatlantique,
443 U.S. 266, 266-67 (1979)).
91. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1274 n.7 (stating "the result in this case is somewhat anachronistic"). The Eleventh Circuit explained that under UPA, which
Georgia adopted in 1984, the partnership, not the individual partners, owns real
property titled to the partnership. See id. (citing O.C.G.A. §14-8-8(f) (Michie Version)). The Eleventh Circuit stated this was anachronistic because if there were a
release of hazardous substances at a partnership property today, the general partners would not own the property and therefore would not be directly liable under
CERCLA. See id.
92. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1274. Prior to Canadyne, the Eleventh Circuit
decided the similar case of Redwing Carriers. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1489.
93. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1272-73 (focusing on "owned" language in
§107(a) (2) of CERCLA).
94. Compare Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1489, with Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269.
Although these cases are potentially distinguishable, the issues discussed in those
opinions were so similar that for all practical purposes, it can be said that the issue
before the Canadyne court was not new.
95. Compare Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1503 (discussing nature of operator
liability), with Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273 (finding Bank owned general partnership in trust).
96. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273 (holding under Georgia law possession of
legal title established ownership).
97. See generally Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REv.
895, 975 n.370 (1996) (discussing parameters which courts must follow when de-
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issues presented in Redwing Carriers and Canadyne are sufficiently
similar.98 A full-blown Kimbell Foods analysis, however, is required if
the facts underlying Canadyneare excessively dissimilar to those underlying Redwing Carriers.99
The mere proposition that NationsBank could be construed as
an owner in Canadyne demonstrated the comprehensiveness of
CERCLA following SARA and ACA. 10 0 While the district court
termining whether to apply state law). Lund notes that following a general rule of
stare decisis is not enough. See id. (citing Judith S. Kaye, The Human Dimension in
Appellate Judging: A Brief Reflection on a Timeless Concern, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1004,
1004-15 (1988) (generally discussing constraints on common law discretion of appellate judges); see alsoJudith S. Kaye, State Courts in OurFederalSystem: The Contribution of the New York Court of Appeals, 46 SYRACUSE L. REv. 217, 220-22 (1995) (listing
as checks on range of state judges' common law making power: separation of powers and legislative checks, role of states within federal system, stare decisis, and case
in controversy requirements); see generally Louise Weinberg, The Federal-StateConflict
of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1743 (1992) (analyzing difference between use of state law and federal law); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83
NW. U.L. REv. 805, 837-38 (1989) (outlining two-step process to determine
whether state or federal law applies).
98. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, PoliticalLegitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist"Perspective, 83 NW. U.L. REV. 761, 801-03 (1989)
(discussing doctrine of stare decisis within context of federal common law). In the
context of Canadyne, stare decisis applies because the Eleventh Circuit had already
held in Redwing Carriers that state law would apply. See Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d
1489. Following Bestfoods, the Eleventh Circuit would be bound to its own precedent unless the court either decided to break from its holding in Redwing Carriers
or was able to distinguish Canadyne. See generally Margaret Gilhooley, The Availability of Decisions and Precedentsin Agency Adjudications: The Impact of the Freedom of Information Act Publication Requirements, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 53, 55 (1989) (describing
alternatives available to courts in using precedent, such as distinguishing cases and
overruling prior precedents of same tribunal) (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)) ("overruling League of Cities and finding application of federal minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to employees
public authority constitutional"), reh'g,National League of Cities v. Usery., 426 U.S.
833 (1976)); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (1975) (replacing contributory
negligence doctrine with comparative negligence doctrine in California"); John
Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 4-7 (1983)
("listing legitimate reasons for court to overrule or decline to follow prior precedent"). Assuming Redwing Carriersand Canadyne are sufficiently similar, the Eleventh Circuit could reasonably adopt in Canadyne the rule established in Redwing
Carriers. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1489.
99. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1489 (holding state law determines liability
of limited partners in such contexts).
100. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273-74. "Comprehensiveness" as used here
means broad in scope. The scope of potential responsibility is best illustrated by
the facts that threatened to bind the Bank to CERCLA liability in Canadyne.
John W. Woolfolk founded the J.W. Woolfolk Company in 1921 and reorganized it in 1941 as a limited partnership named Woolfolk Chemical Works, Ltd.
(WCW), to manufacture pesticides. See Brief of Appellant at 6, Canadyne-Georgia
Corporation v. NationsBank, N.A. (South) (11th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-9357). WCW
was located in Fort Valley, Georgia (the "Site").
Mr. Woolfolk was a general partner in WCW at that time and held an ownership interest in excess of 50%, which he subsequently used in developing three
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agreed state law was appropriate, the court was not convinced that
NationsBank could be construed as an owner under Georgia law.10 1

Consequently, the district court granted NationsBank's motion to
dismiss Canadyne's amended complaint under Rule 12(b) (6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it failed to state a
10 2
claim for which relief could be granted.
inter vivos trusts. See id. Fulton National Bank of Atlanta was named co-trustee of

these trusts, See id. Mr. Woolfolk continued as general partner in WCW until his
death in 1945. See id.
Woolfolk's will named Fulton co-executor of his estate, which included his
general partnership interest in WCW. See id. The Bank became a trustee for his
general partnership interest in WCW in 1950; WCW incorporated in 1972; the
corporation was purchased by a corporate affiliate of Canadyne in 1977; and
Canadyne sold the pesticide business and most of its assets in 1984. See id. Shortly
thereafter, Fulton resigned as trustee of both the 1942 and 1950 trusts and delivered the trust assets to new trustees. See id.
Sometime between 1990 and 1995, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") determined that the Site had been excessively polluted by the release of
hazardous substances (e.g., arsenic) into the land, air and water. See id. As a result,
EPA ordered Canadyne, as current owner of the Site, to clean up the Site. See id.
Canadyne complied at a cost exceeding $15 million. See id. (stating that Canadyne
expects to incur another $10-35 million before cleanup is complete). In 1996,
following Fulton's resignation as trustee of the 1942 and 1950 trusts, Fulton
merged with the Bank. See id.
Canadyne brought this action in 1996 against the Bank under CERCLA and
the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act ("HSRA") to recover some or all of the
costs it had incurred as a result of its cleanup of the area surrounding the Woolfolk
chemical plant. See id.
101. See Canadyne-Georgia Corporation v. NationsBank, N.A. (South), 982 F.
Supp. 886, rev'd, 183 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999).
102. See id. at 891. The district court began its analysis by considering CERCLA's statutory language. See id. Based on that language, the court reasoned that
if the Bank could have been characterized as an owner at the time of the disposal
of a hazardous substance, the Bank would be responsible as a prior owner. See id.
To determine if this characterization was appropriate, the district court considered
the Bank's predecessor's role with regards to the Site at the time Fulton National
served as trustee. See id. All parties agreed that Bank's predecessor was a co-trustee
of a trust which was a general partner which held an ownership interest in the Site.
See id. The district court analyzed the Bank's involvement as a partner and as a
trustee separately. See id.
The district court began by contrasting current Georgia law to Georgia law at
the time Fulton National held a general partnership interest in Woolfolk Chemical
Works. See id. The district court noted that under current Georgia law "the partnership and not the individual partners owns real property titled to the partnership under current law." Id. at 888 (citing O.C.G.A. §14-8- 8(d)). The court stated,
however, that "this was not the case at the time Fulton National held a general
partnership interest in Woolfolk Chemical Works." Id. (citing Bloodworth v.
Bloodworth, 178 S.E.2d 198, 200 (Ga. 1970)) (stating "[legal title to real property
can never vest in a partnership as such; legal title is in the partners as tenants in
common").
The district court concluded that under Georgia law at the time of release
"ownership of the facility was split between the individual partners, who owned the
real property, and the partnership, which owned everything else." Id. In short, the
district court held that the partners of the 1950 Trust were all owners and consequently, the Bank could be regarded as a prior owner. See id. Nonetheless, the
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Canadyne appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit in 1999.103 Canadyne asserted that the district
court erred in concluding that NationsBank was not a "covered person" under CERCLA. 10 4 Additionally, because NationsBank was
negligent in causing an environmental hazard, it was personally liable as a fiduciary. 10 5 In short, Canadyne argued that these issues
10 6
clearly state a claim on which relief can be granted.
The Eleventh Circuit held that NationsBank was an "owner"
for purposes of CERCLA and that Canadyne stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted, negating the 12 (b) (6) portion of the
district court's order.10 7 Having met these burdens, the Court of
district court noted that the Bank's partnership interest was held as trustee (i.e.,
the trust was the partner). See id. The district court concluded that under the laws
of Georgia, ownership responsibilities of a trustee were limited. See id.
The district court followed Redwing Carriersand applied Georgia law at the
time of release of hazardous substance, stating "Georgia trust law prohibited liability for the obligations of the partnership." Id. at 890. Based on this restriction, the
district court concluded that Fulton National could not be considered owners
under CERCLA. See id.
The district court first defined "general partner" under current Georgia law.
See id. After establishing that a trust is included within the meaning of general
partner, the district court assessed the extent of a trustee-general partner's liability
under historical Georgia law. See id. The court concluded that the statute in effect
at the time Fulton National owned the partnership interest in trust was very limited
in scope. See id. Consequently, the district court looked to common law to determine whether Georgia law would have barred the liability of a trustee for an action
in tort. See id.
The district court cited several Georgia cases to conclude that Georgia law
stood for the proposition that "[w] here the privileges of ownership are restricted,
the obligations of ownership should be limited accordingly." Id. at 890. The district court interpreted these cases to mean fiduciaries were afforded protection
from liability by not fully regarding the fiduciary as owner to begin with. See id.
Specifically, the district court equated the effect of Mr. Woolfolk's instructions
in his will to the directions from the settlor in Beaudry, Inc. v. Freeman, 73 Ga.
App. 736 (1946). See id. at 889. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the
Bank lacked control over the Site. See id. In short, the district court determined
that the issue of control was central to Georgia's understanding of ownership. See
id.
However, the district court did not discuss Canadyne's second claim that the
Bank was protected from liability by ACA because ACA is applicable only to protect
owners from liability under CERCLA. See id. Since the court found the Bank was
not a covered person, the Bank could not be characterized as an owner for purposes of CERCLA. See id. Thus, district court concluded that the protection afforded by ACA was neither necessary nor applicable. See id.
103. See Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A. (South), 183 F.3d
1269 (1 th Cir. 1999) (hearing appeal from lower district court in case of Canadyne).
104. See id. at 1275 (presenting claim that Bank was PRP).
105. See id. (discussing claim that negligence exception to liability exemption
applied).
106. See id. (presenting argument that lower court improperly dismissed case).
107. See id. at 1269 (holding that plaintiff did state claim upon which relief
could be granted).
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Appeals reversed the District Court's resolution of NationsBank's
motion to dismiss.' 0 8 The Eleventh Circuit essentially ruled that a
court should look to state law in defining ownership or prior ownership for purposes of CERCLA. a0 9 If ownership involves a statutory
law, such as partnership law, that statutory law should be referenced. 110 If that particular statute involves earlier non-repealed
earlier statutory law, the court should use the earlier law."'
108. See Canadyne 183 F.3d at 1276. Both the district court and the Eleventh
Circuit agreed that historical state common-law was appropriately used at the partner level. See id. Setting aside the issue of vicarious liability, use of this body of law
permitted the Eleventh Circuit to classify the Bank as "owner" even though contemporary state and federal law would not have. See id. Unlike the district court,
however, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Bank remained an "owner" even
at the trustee level of the ownership question. See id. The Eleventh Circuit noted
that its result was "anachronistic" but, nonetheless, found its resolution of
Canadyne to be consistent with precedent. See id.
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that "[t]he question of
whether a particular defendant can be deemed an 'owner' under CERCLA turns
on application of state law ....
Id. at 1273. The Eleventh Circuit also noted that
because of this "the answer [of liability] may vary from state to state." Id. The
Eleventh Circuit further agreed that it was specifically to look to state law "at the
time of the release of hazardous substances at the Site to determine whether the Bank
was an owner for purposes of CERCLA liability." Id. (emphasis added).
Based on this point of agreement, the Eleventh Circuit's outcome mirrored
the reasoning of the district court up through the adoption of the individual liability rule of Bloodworth. Hence, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that partners were to be
individually liable as tenants in common. See id. Also like the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit claimed to apply Redwing Carriers. See id. Unlike the district court,
however, the Eleventh Circuit did not apply Beaudry, or if it did, disagreed with the
district court's interpretation of Beaudry. See id. Thus, the district court and the
Eleventh Circuit differed in their resolution of the trustee level of the ownership
question.
The Eleventh Circuit departed from the district court in its analysis of the
trustee level of the ownership question. See id. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
since current Georgia law holds that trustees hold legal title to real property, the
fact that the Bank held legal title to the trust required that the Bank be regarded as
an "owner" under CERCLA because the holding of title is equivalent to owning
real property. See id.
The Eleventh Circuit does not explain its non-use of Beaudry nor does it address the issue of control discussed by the district court. Nonetheless, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the Bank could be classified as a PRP and therefore proceeded
to analyze the negligence question. See id.
109. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269 (stating that state law should apply in
determining CERCLA ownership question).
110. See id. (applying state partnership statute to determine CERCLA ownership question).
111. See id. (looking at state partnership law in effect at time defendant partnership was formed). It is certain that the Eleventh Circuit looked to current state
statutory law and analyzed the Bank's ownership according to that law. See id. at
1273. Since RULPA did not repeal prior versions of the Act, the Eleventh Circuit
looked to the older version of the Act (i.e., the one the Bank formed its partnership under). See id. This rule, without further speculation, can be thought of as
the Canadyne "historical state statutory law" rule.
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The differences between "owner" and "operator" become significant once it is decided that state law is applicable. Regardless of
whether NationsBank "owned" or "operated" the site, its relationship to the cleanup site was at issue in determining NationsBank's
status as a PRP. 112 In this sense, there is no difference between the
requirements to establish an entity as an owner and those necessary
to establish it as an operator. As a result, there is no significant
While it is clear that the Eleventh Circuit looked to historical state statutory
law, it is not clear whether the Eleventh Circuit also looked to historical state case
law. The district court clearly did. See Canadyne, 982 F. Supp. at 889. If the Eleventh Circuit did look to historical state case law in interpreting historical state
statutory law, the Eleventh Circuit's rule can be thought of as the Canadyne "historical state statutory and case law" rule. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit may have
looked at historical state case law but concluded that applying such law would be
inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action and thus per
Redwing Carriers,could not be applied (perhaps because such case law considered
control as an element of ownership, which would threaten Congress' ostensible
intent that CERCLA be a strict liability statute). If the Eleventh Circuit in fact
found this, the Canadyne rule can be considered a "partial preemption" rule. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit may have rejected the use of historical state case law all
together and only looked to historical state statutory law.
Aside from the primary theme of this Comment, each of the above mentioned
theories presents its own set of problems. Discussion of these theories is beyond
the scope of this Comment, and they will be dismissed here with little discussion.
Generally speaking, however, the problem presented with not using case law in
construing a statute is that statutes rely on case law for giving effect to the intent of
the framers of such legislation. Just as Congress relies on case law like Bestfoods for
giving CERCLA effect, so too may the Georgia legislature have intended case law
such as Beaudty to have been used in conjunction with its partnership statute. If
the legislature never intended for its statute to apply as it would without Beaudy,
then applying the statute without Beaudry could result in a non-owner being described as an owner. If ownership is the basis for responsibility and one of Congress' goals is to hold responsible parties responsible, then applying such a statute
without case law operates against Congress' intent. Both as a matter of precedent
in the Eleventh Circuit and as a general matter of preemption, such a rule would
be improper.
The alternative offers little relief from the problem. If historical state case law
is used, the problem of non-uniformity emerges. Three basic property rights have
been recognized in the common law to give rise to ownership: title (the right to
dispose of property), occupancy (the right to use property) and control (the right
to direct or affect the use of or benefits from property). See 1 THOMPSON, ON REAL
PROPERTY 8 (1977); see also PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, §57 (5th ed. 1984); Restatement (2d) Torts §328E. While it may be true that uniformity has increased
over the years with respect to ownership laws, the opposite is also true. The earlier
ownership occurs, the less uniform state laws tend to be. Thus, the uniformity
which compelled the Eleventh Circuit in Redwing Carriersto reject the need for a
common federal law may not exist in a Canadyne-type context. See Redwing Carriers,
94 F.3d 1489. Earlier non-repealed state statutory law is referred to hereinafter as
"historical state statutory law."
112. See generally Glen M. Vogel, An Examination of Two of New York States
Brownfields Remediation Initiatives: Title V of the 1996 Bond Act and the Voluntary
Remediation Program, 17 PACE ENVrL. L. REv. 83, 107 (1999) (stating that liability
will ultimately depend in part on volunteer's legal relationship to contamination
on site).
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difference between Redwing Carriersand Canadyne.113 Moreover, as
the Eleventh Circuit stated in Redwing Carriers, there is substantial
1 14
agreement within current state law for determining ownership.
Thus, as far as determining ownership is concerned, there is no real
need for a common federal rule. 1 15 It, therefore, appears that the
Eleventh Circuit may have been correct in applying Redwing Carriers
to Canadyne without engaging in a full Kimbell Foods analysis.
There is a significant fact distinguishing Redwing Carriersfrom
Canadyne, however. Canadyne involved prior owners while Redwing
Carriersinvolved current operators. 116 This difference is significant
because prior ownership cases sometimes involve ownership statutes (e.g., Uniform Partnership Acts). 11 7 These statutes often include in their current language, provisions incorporating nonrepealed prior versions of that statue.1 18 Ownership standards of
this variety are less uniform and hence, create a greater need for a
common federal rule than where historical state law is relied on
less. 1 9 Where uniformity is compromised in application of a federal statute such as CERCLA, there is generally grounds for adopt113. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1489 (applying Alabama state law to determine whether term "partner" created obligation as "owner" or "operator" for CERCLA purposes); see also Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269 (applying Georgia state law to
determine whether general partnership interest was "owner" as defined by
CERCLA).
114. See, e.g., Blyth, supra note 4, at 119 (stating that uniform partnership laws
have been adopted in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming).
115. See generally Gilhooley, supra note 98, at 55. Gilhooley stated:
[c]ourts are not inflexibly bound by precedent. They may distinguish
earlier cases and, thereby, reach an alternative result in a particular case
by finding that the precedent dealt with a significantly different situation
than the case at hand. Courts also can overrule prior precedents of the
same tribunal in subsequent decisions by explaining the reasons warranting a change.
Id.
116. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269 (dismissing complaint in district court for
costs incurred in clean up of waste site under CERCLA against defendant trustee
bank, whose trust assets included partnership interests in previous owner).
117. See id. (applying state partnership statute which was in effect at time of
partnership formation but which has since been changed).
118. See O.C.G.A. §14-8-8(f).
119. See generally Daniel C. K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of International
Law: Toward a Federal Common Law of InternationalChoice Law, 74 IowA L. REv. 165
(1988) (generally discussing lack of uniformity as reason for developing federal
common law).
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120
ing a common federal law, which will re-establish uniformity.
This difference merits a full-blown Kimbell Foods analysis for deter12 1
mining if state law should have been applied.
Based on the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Redwing Carriers,it
seems clear that the Eleventh Circuit was predisposed to analyzing
the state law versus federal law choice-of-law issue according to Kimbell Foods.122 It is not clear, however, that the Eleventh Circuit intended its holding in Redwing Carriers to stand for the general
proposition that state law would always be used in determining ownership questions under CERCLA. To the contrary, the Eleventh
Circuit's analysis seems to indicate that if a Kimbell Foods analysis
were to come out differently, a common federal rule would be
12 3
appropriate.
In Canadyne, the Eleventh Circuit claims to have followed their
own precedent set in Redwing Carriers.124 The question remains,
however, as to whether in Canadyne, the Eleventh Circuit actually
expanded the Redwing Carriers rule, which used the Kimbell Foods
test. 125 The Canadynecourt has arguably forged a new, more expansive, yet relatively non-laudable rule, which Congress will not likely
take notice of and therefore fail to correct. 126 The ultimate ques-

120. See Cynthia Nance, Affiliated Corporation Liability Under the Warn Act, 52
L. REv. 495, 518 (2000) (discussing need for common federal law when
use of state law results in inconsistent treatment of federal statutes).
121. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 720 (1979) (analyzing question of whether state law should apply). See generally Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and ProcedureJurisdiction and Related Matters 2000 Pocket Part §4514 (2000) (discussing federal
common law and role of uniformity in determining whether courts should forge
such law). While the Eleventh Circuit may be justified in applying Redwing Carriers
to circumstances that are similar to Redwing Carriers,the court is less justified in
broadly applying that case when circumstances differ. See Gilhooley, supra note 98,
at 55. As the court noted in Redwing Carriers,uniformity is a serious consideration.
See Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1501. Thus, by the Eleventh Circuit's own rule,
Canadyne should have been carefully analyzed according to Kimbell Foods. See
Gilhooley, supra note 98, at 55.
122. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d 1489 (applying Kimbell Foods test to CERCLA
ownership question). The Eleventh Circuit in Redwing Carriers applied Kimbell
Foods and held that there was no need for a common federal law. See id. The
Supreme Court later failed to strike down the use of state law in a similar context
and, in effect, affirmed Redwing Carriers.See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 56.
123. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d 1489. The Eleventh Circuit reached its conclusion to apply state law in Redwing Carriersbecause the Kimbell Foods criteria were
met. See id.
124. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d 1269 (citing and claiming to follow Redwing
Carriers).
125. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d 1489 (discussing Kimbell Foods but not explicitly going through elements).
126. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d 1269 (holding that state law should apply, as did
Redwing Carriers,but extending rule beyond facts of Redwing Carriers).
RUTGERS
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tion arising from Redwing Carriers, as seen in light of Canadyne, is
whether the issue presented in Canadyne is sufficiently different
from Redwing Carriersas to lead to the conclusion that a common
federal law is needed. 127 To determine whether to adopt the
Canadyne rule, courts may be left to analyze for themselves the
soundness of the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in Canadyne.
V.

CONGRESS' LIKELY RESPONSE TO CANADYNE

Due to modern uniformity in current state law regarding property ownership, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that using state law
for defining ownership would not likely be problematic. 128 The Supreme Court appears to have been correct because there has not
been any sign of state legislatures rearranging ownership laws to
frustrate goals underlying CERCLA. 1 29 Similarly, the judiciary has
not widely discussed the problem because facts such as those
13 0
presented in Canadyne are uncommon.
Given the rare occurrences of such litigation, it is not surprising that Congress failed to further define "own" or "owned" in its
most recent amendment to CERCLA. 1 31 Nonetheless, this issue has
emerged in the Eleventh Circuit and will likely emerge again over
time. 13 2 In the absence of legislative guidance, it is in the hands of
127. See Gilhooley, supra note 98, at 55 (discussing precedent and ways of distinguishing cases).
128. See Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1501-02 (describing as "groundless" any
fears that states will engage in a "race to the bottom"). The Eleventh Circuit continued, stating "[s]tates have a substantial interest in protecting their citizens and
state resources. Most states have their own counterparts to CERCLA and EPA and
they share a complementary interest with the United States in enforcement of laws
like CERCLA that are used to remedy environmental contamination." Id. The
Eleventh Circuit then concluded that there was "no necessity to create federal
common law in this area to guard against the risk that states will create safe havens
for polluters" because they did not "foresee states enacting more protective statutes in an effort to defeat CERCLA's goal of having the polluter pay." Id.
129. See Bradford C. Mank, SHOULD STATE CORPORATE LAW DEFINE SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY?: THE DEMISE OF CERCLA's FEDERAL COMMON LAW, 68 U. CIN. L. REv.
1157, 1160 (2000) (stating in context of successor liability that "[t]here is no evidence that states are engaging in a 'race-to-the-bottom'

..

. to protect corporations

from CERCLA liability") (quoting Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 922 F.2d
1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991)(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
130. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d 1269 (deciding case where party's ownership was
determined by both past state common law, which differed from current state common law, and current state statute, which incorporated prior state statute).
131. See Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection, PUB. L. No. 104-208, §§2501-2505, 110 Stat. at 3009462 to -469 (1996), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§9601 (2), 9607(n), 6991 (b) (h) (9).
132. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d 1272-73 (deciding case similar to Redwing
Carriers).
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courts to apply CERCLA according to legislative intent. 133 Given
the paucity of legislative history, the task is not easy.13 4 In light of
the Court's holding in Bestfoods, however, the Supreme Court is
likely to uphold the use of state law as far as practicable. 135 In the
context of Canadyne, the Supreme Court would most likely be inclined to adopt a partial-preemption rule wherein state law is applied to the extent that such law does not frustrate congressional
purpose.1 3 6 This is the rule adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Red137
wing Carriersand hence, probably the rule affirmed in Canadyne.
If Congress finds that any of the courts have incorrectly applied CERCLA or one of its two subsequent amendments, it must
acknowledge and correct the misconception or risk having Congressional silence taken to mean approval. In the case of Canadyne,
the gratuitous increase to CERCLA's comprehensiveness achieved
by the Eleventh Circuit's application may have to be surrendered
and Congress may have to settle for leaving ACA as it was
138
created.

133. See generallyApache Nitrogen Prods., Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 145 F.R.D.
674, 678 (D. Ariz. 1993) (illustrating importance of analyzing Congress' intent in
interpreting statute).
134. See Oswald, supra note 11, at 223 n.3 (discussing paucity of legislative
history to CERCLA and its amendments).
135. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 62-64 (holding that courts could choose to apply
state law, rather than crafting federal common law); see also United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (showing
reasoning behind Court's tendency to affirm its own precedent). The Weber Court
stated that when a question is statutory, the Court has the assurance that Congress
may set a different course if it chooses and will likely do so if the Court misperceives the political will. See id.
136. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 469-81
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing usurpation of state law and noting
Court's value of finding "least intrusive federal approach imaginable"). Thus, if it
can be shown that a congressional purpose is the uniform application of CERCLA
with regard to finding PRPs, the Supreme Court would still prefer a partial-preemption scheme over a full preemption scheme because partial-preemption is less
intrusive.
137. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1501 (choosing to apply state law when
determining whether federal common law or state should govern when limited
partners can be held accountable for partnerships CERCLA liability).
138. See 42 U.S.C. §§9601(2), 9607(n), 6991(b) (h) (9). ACA has been described as a less than conspicuously passed piece of legislation furthering the intent of some stealthy legislatures. See Buzbee, supra note 52, at 10656. Essentially,
it is asserted that the ACA was specifically meant to exempt certain fiduciaries from
personal liability but that Act does not validly imply that Congress intends for anyone and everyone to be included as PRPs, especially if in doing so uniformity is
sacrificed. See Garrou, supra note 3, 113 (quoting Rep. Barney Frank as stating
"nothing is more damaging to a good regulatory scheme than having anything in it
that could inadvertently sweep out within its coils innocent individuals").
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The reality of the situation is that Congress is not likely to expand the definition of "own" or "owned" under CERCLA. By default, it is thus up to the courts to interpret CERCLA, including
SARA and ACA. i3 9 Regardless of how the Eleventh Circuit reached
its decision, the end result is anachronistic. 140 Moreover, Canadyne
displayed the reality that using state law can lead to the inconsistent
application of CERCLA.14 1 For these reasons, Kimbell Foods advised
in favor of adopting a common federal law for determining prior
142
ownership under CERCLA.

Advocates argue that a fully comprehensive CERCLA is clearly
consistent with Congress' goal of holding responsible parties liable. 143 These parties also advocate that courts read CERCLA in
such a way as to cause as many PRPs as possible to pass through the
first layer of CERCLA's bifurcated liability structure. 144 These advocates are likely to perceive the Canadyne rule as positive.1 45 Those
who more moderately prescribe to the remedial purpose canon
may, however, argue that the Eleventh Circuit has made CERCLA
overly comprehensive. 146 These critics would argue Congress never

139. See generally Apache Nitrogen Products, Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 145

F.R.D. 674, 678 (D. Ariz. 1993).
140. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273-74 n.7 (admitting "the result in this case is
somewhat anachronistic").

141. See id. at 1273 (noting that "[u]nder current Georgia law, the partnership, not the individual partners, owns real property held in the name of the partnership" but that "[a]t the time the Bank held a general partnership interest in
WCW . .. the individual partners owned the real property of the partnership"
(citations omitted)).
142. See KimbellFoods, 440 U.S. at 715 (1979) (providing test for determining
whether common federal law should be formed).
143. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Co., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982) (stating "CERCLA should be given a broad and liberal construction
...to limit the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs...").
144. See id. (arguing for liberal construction of potential responsibility provisions under CERCLA).
145. See, e.g., Anspec Co. Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247
(6th Cir. 1991) (stating "the remedial nature of CERCLA's scheme requires the
courts to interpret its provisions broadly to avoid frustrating the legislative purposes"); see also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d
1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating "we are . .. obligated to construe [CERCLA]
liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative purposes).
146. See generallyLisa M. Schenck, Liability of Municipalities Under the Comprehensive Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): Is This a Legal Hazard to the
Environment?, 23 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1 (discussing recent opinions that CERCLA
has been stretched too far, including individuals as PRPs which was not Congress'
intention).
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intended potential responsibility to reach parties such as Nation1 47

sBank in Canadyne.

The Canadyne rule has permitted a party to be held potentially
responsible under CERCLA who otherwise might have escaped potential responsibility had the Kimbell Foods rationale been applied. 148 This arguably furthers Congress' goals of comprehensively
covering as many parties as possible. Nonetheless, the analytical
framework presented in Canadyne pales in comparison to the analysis of Redwing Carriers.149 In fact, in failing to follow Kimbell Foods, it
is arguable that the Eleventh Circuit has failed to follow its own
precedent. If the Eleventh Circuit followed judicial precedent,
there would be a good argument for adopting a common federal
law for determining prior ownership when historical state law is
implicated.
VI.

AN ARGUMENT FOR A COMMON FEDERAL LAW

The Eleventh Circuit presumably would conclude that a common federal law would be appropriate when three factors are met:
(1) state law is not sufficiently uniform; (2) applying state law would
threaten Congress' goal of holding only responsible parties liable;
and (3) having a common federal law would not disrupt the numerous commercial relationships predicated on state law.15 0 Redwing
Carriersformerly held that there was no need for a common federal
law for determining prior ownership and status as a prior operator.15 ' The same issue presented itself in Canadyne.15 2 In Canadyne,
147. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REc. S8629 (daily ed. June 23, 1992) (Statement of

Sen. Lautenberg) (stating with reference to categories other than attenuated owners that "the original statute never intended such parties be sued").
148. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273 (finding Bank potentially responsible due

to interpretation and application of dated and since repealed Georgia state statutory law); O.C.G.A. §53-12-2(11) (2000) (stating trustee holds legal title to property in trust).

149. Compare Canadyne, 982 F. Supp. at 888 (stating simply that "the Court
looks to Georgia law to define the ownership interest of general partners in the
Site" (citing and applying rule of Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1498)) with Redwing

Carriers,94 F.3d at 1500-02 (quoting and analyzing Kimbell Foods according to situation posed in that case).
150. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1500-02 (listing opposite reasons with respect to why Kimbell Foods supports conclusion that no common federal rule should
apply in Redwing Carriers);see also Kimbell Foods 440 U.S. at 740 (fashioning a threeprong test for determining whether to create a uniform common law or to adopt
applicable state law rule as federal standard).
151. See id. at 1501 (stating that after applying Kimbell Foods test, applicable

state laws should determine when limited partner can be held accountable under
CERCLA).
152. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d 1269, 1273 (discussing whether to apply state law

or to use federal common law).
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however, a prior version of state statutory law was at issue. 153 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit applied the Redwing Carriersrule without revisiting its analysis of Kimbell Foods.1 5 4 An analysis of that rule
revealed that Canadyne should have set a different rule. 155 According to the Eleventh Circuit's own reasoning, a common federal rule
should be adopted that overturns that part of state statutory law
which would cause courts to analyze non-repealed versions of own156
ership statutes.
The first prong of Kimbell Foods ascertained whether a need for
a common federal law existed. 15 7 The Eleventh Circuit determined
that no federal common law would be necessary if uniform state law
existed. 158 When there is not consistency, however, a preliminary
question must be asked, specifically whether Congress intended for
159
CERCLA to be uniformly applied.
Numerous law review articles and alternative secondary sources
illustrate the problem areas of CERCLA. 160 These issues are likely
to catch Congress' eye and may, where Congress deems a court rule
contrary to Congressional intent, legislatively overrule them.16 ' As
153. See id. (applying Georgia statutory law from 1940's).
154. See id. (citing Kimbell Foods as supporting conclusion but not engaging in
Kimbell Foods analysis to extent Eleventh Circuit did in Redwing Carriers).
155. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727-28 (providing analysis of whether federal common law should be formed).
156. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1500-02 (discussing importance of achieving Congress' intent).
157. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (discussing test for determining whether
there is need for common federal law).
158. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1501 (discussing importance of uniformity
in state law if state law is to apply).
159. See id. at 1501-02 (discussing preliminary question of whether uniformity
in state law is required).
160. See generallyJohn Copeland Nagle, CERCLA's Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1405 (1997);James A. Rogers, Laura B. Aheam; Ijay Palansky, CERCLA Claims
Under Section 107 Versus 113: The State Lawyer's Perspective in an Uncertain Field, 11,
No. 11 NAAG NAT'L ENVrL. ENFORCEMENTJ. 3 (1997); Edward B. Sears & Laurie P.
Sears, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Uncertain Times for Lenders, 24 Envt'l. L. Rptr.
10320 (1994); L. De-Wayne Layfield, CERCLA Successor Liability, and the Federal Common law: Responding to an Uncertain Legal Standard, 68 TEX. L. REv. 1237 (1990).
"Problem areas" are herein meant to refer to ambiguities in CERCLA requiring
interpretation.
161. See Daniel L. Rotenberg, CongressionalSilence in the Supreme Court, 47 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 375 (1992) (stating that "the Supreme Court can interpret legislative
silence in virtually any way it sees fit"). Although Congress may legislatively overrule a court ruling it disfavors, Congress' silence cannot always be taken for approval. See John Robertson, "ForOur Own Good:" Federal Preemption of State Tort
Law-Risk, Regulation, and the Goals of EnvironmentalProtection,20 WM. & MARY ENVIR. L. & POL. REv. 143, 144 (1995) (noting that "any meaning courts may find in
congressional silence is contrived at best"); NLRB v. Plasterers' Local Union No.
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discussed above, one area receiving sufficient press is CERCLA's
16 2
vague definition of ownership for entities such as partnerships.
On one hand, Congress' silence in the face of conflicting laws
indicates its ambivalence to non-uniformity, and perhaps, the absence of a need for a common federal law.1 63 On the other hand,
less obvious issues may not face wide enough debate to impress on
Congress the need for an additional amendment.1 64 Since Congress' silence on the Canadyne issue of whether to apply state law is
not laudable, lower courts faced with similar issues must decide for
themselves if the rule set by the Eleventh Circuit in Canadyne is
worth adopting.
While some of the potential rules forged by the Eleventh Circuit are more sound than others, the most reasonable rule, federal
preemption, was not adopted in Canadyne.165 Not even a partial
preemption scheme would be as effective because statutes are often
dependent on case law to further the drafter's intent. 166 Depriving
a party of a statute's full effect leads to the possibility that a nonowner will be held potentially responsible on the level of an
owner. 167 This contradicts Congress' intent of holding responsible
79, 404 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1971) (noting the danger of adopting silence as congressional intent).
162. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Development Corp.,
976 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting vague definition of owner under
CERCLA).
163. See generallyBohemia, Inc. v. Home Insurance Co., 725 F.2d 506, 510 (9th
Cir. 1984) (stating in context of admiralty practice, if there is no need for uniformity then state law must be applied).
164. SeeJohnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S.
616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting that congressional inaction cannot
be regarded as acquiescence under all circumstances and concluding that any reliance on congressional failure to act is necessarily a "canard").
165. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d 1269 (applying state law instead of common federal law).
166. See generally Gordon K. Davidson, John F. Platz, Thomas J. Hall, Section
3(a)(1O) of the Securities Act of 1933: The Use of State Fairness hearings in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 1171 PLI/CoP 777, n.27 (2000) (stating that statutory meaning of
fairness "often is derived from case law that interprets and applies the statute(s),
rather than from the specific language of the statute(s)); see also Canadyne, 982 F.
Supp. at 889 (stating that "[b]ecause the statute in effect at the time Fulton National owned the partnership interest in trust had such a limited scope, the Court
must survey the common law to determine whether Georgia law would have barred
the liability of a trustee for an action in tort").
167. See Canadyne, 982 F. Supp. at 889. The district court noted in Canadyne
that state case law filled gaps in the state statute, which the court determined applied in determining whether the Bank was an owner for purposes of CERCLA. See
id. The district court went on to note that Georgia state case law modified the
"traditional rule." See id. The result of ignoring that law would be to not fully give
effect to the underlying legislature's intent. Such a result is counter to basic procedural law. See Erie Rail Road v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 66 (1938) (requiring fed-
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parties accountable. 168 A more preferable rule would be a single
federal rule holding that only current state statutory and case law
may be used in defining both ownership and prior ownership. This
common federal rule would not only provide uniformity where
non-uniform state laws would prohibit a consistent application of
CERCLA, but also advances Congress' goal of holding only responsible parties accountable. 169 This rule would also preserve present
commercial relationships predicated on state law.1 70 All that is preempted under this proposed rule is non-repealed historical state
statutory ownership law, which, by its nature, is not likely uniform
among states. 17 1 This proposed rule furthers Congress' articulated
goals with respect to CERCLA and is, therefore, most consistent
with Kimbell Foods and Bestfoods. 1 72 Such a rule would eliminate the
"anachronism" identified by the Eleventh Circuit in Canadyne.173
A.

Diversity in State Case Law Creates the Need For a Federal
Rule

A quick way of assessing ownership under CERCLA would be
to equate ownership with holding title. Some courts have held that
possession of title, or lack thereof, is dispositive of the question of
ownership under CERCLA. 174 The district court in City of Phoenix v.
eral courts, when there is no common federal law, to apply state law of state in
which the court resides, including that states' common law).
168. See generally Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Truck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662,
665 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that two primary goals of CERCLA are enabling EPA
to respond efficiently and expeditiously to toxic spills and holding those parties
responsible for releases liable for costs of cleanup).
169. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313,
1317 (11th Cir. 1990) (commenting on CERCLA's purposes, one of which was to
ensure that PRPs are held responsible).
170. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 729 (listing as factor to be considered before
federal common law is adopted, extent to which application of federal rule would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law).
171. SeeJ. William Callison, Blind Men and Elephants: FiduciaryDuties Under the
Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, and Beyond, 1 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 109 (1997) (noting that uniform partnership laws
helped unify what had been diverse ownership laws among states but stating that
.partnership law is rapidly becoming nonuniform").
172. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 726 (discussing analysis of when federal
common law should be adopted) (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) which states, "[i]n absence of an applicable act of Congress it is for Federal Courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their
own standard"); Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 55 (applying Kimbell Foods and concluding
that state law could be applied under circumstances of case).
173. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1274.
174. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1277 (E.D.
Pa. 1994) (concluding that defendant whose name had appeared on title to property used as landfill was owner). City of Phoenix, 816 F. Supp. at 568. But see United
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Garbage Serv., Co., 17 5 for example, clearly held that "a trustee is an

'owner' for purposes of §107 of CERCLA, even though the trustee
176
may hold only bare legal title.
Other district courts, such as the Northern District of Illinois,
emphasize the issue of control when determining if a party is an
owner under CERCLA. 177 It is not clear from the statutory lanStates v. Carolawn Co., 14 Envt'l L. Rptr. 20698, 20698-99 (Civ. No. 83-2132-0)
(D.S.C. 1984) (refusing to dismiss CERCLA claim against one who owned fee interest in site for an hour "as a conduit to others"); see also United States v. Argent
Corp., 14 Envt'l L. Rptr. 20616, 20670 (D. N. M. 1984) (holding that property
owner that leased warehouse in which the lessee operated business utilizing hazardous chemicals was "owner" subject to liability under §107(a) (2) of CERCLA,
even though owner argued that it had no connection with business); United States
v. CKMG Realty Co. (Sharkley Landfill), 96 F.3d 706, 707 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
no liability for former owner whose only connect to site was passive ownership of
site). In CKMG Realty Co., a revealing factor considered by the court in denying
liability to former owner was the existence of the passive migration of contamination before prior owner's ownership. See id. While using title as the test for ownership may be a convenient method for assessing ownership, courts are divided on
whether holding bare legal tide is adequate and even necessary. See United States
v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1984)
(finding nuisance liability based on rights to control property). A non-title holding adverse possessor, for example, may be held potentially responsible based on
his right, ability or duty to control some part of the property.
175. 816 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D. Ariz. 1993).
176. City of Phoenix v. Garbage Serv., Co., 816 F. Supp. 564, 568 (D. Ariz.
1993). The district court in City of Phoenix was highly influenced by its interpretation of Burns and its direct consideration of this topic. See id. (quoting United
States v. Bums, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. WL 242553, at *2 (D.N.H. Sept. 12,
1988). The City of Phoenix court stated that Burns based its decision on the ground
that the defendant "as trustee, held legal title to the trust property and under trust
law could be liable for obligations as the owner of the property." (citation omitted). See id.
It is true that Burns emphasized legal title in its analysis. See id. Burns, however, arguably does not stand for the holding set forth in City of Phoenix that the
holding of bare legal tide is enough to find ownership for the purposes of CERCIA liability. City of Phoenix, 816 F. Supp. at 568. Burns involved a motion to dismiss by the defendant based on the grounds that he never owned the land in
question. See Burns, 1988 WL 242553, at *1.
In forming its decision, the Burns court mentioned several times that the trustee was not only the trustee but also the beneficiary. See id. at *2 (stating "as trustee
and beneficiary of the Trust that owned the Polythane Site, Crowley possessed at
least some evidence of ownership of the Polythene site"). The trustee in that case
held legal tide as trustee and had some control as beneficiary. See id. Since the
court emphasized that the trustee "possessed at least some evidence of ownership,"
it is reasonable to assume the court was influenced by the control element. Id.
As a result, it cannot be asserted with certainty that Burns stood for the City of
Phoenix proposition that "atrustee is an 'owner' for the purposes of section 107 of
CERCLA, even though the trustee may hold only bare legal title." City of Phoenix,
816 F. Supp. at 568.
177. See, e.g., Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 274 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(holding that since trustee had "authority to control" waste handling practices and
prevent hazardous waste damage, trustee could have CERCLA liability and discussing assignment of liability through the "prevention" test (citing Kelley v. Thomas
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guage whether elements of control are necessary to find owmership. 178 Courts that have found control to be a relevant factor vary
with respect to their treatment of this issue. 179 One Illinois court
was willing to find non-title holders owners if that particular party
possessed the authority to control the property. 180 A Massachusetts
court found ownership if there was any equivalent evidence of ownership. 181 Additionally, a later Illinois case found that even if a
party does hold legal title, ownership would not be found if the
trustee completely lacked control over what was done with the
land.1 82 A Pennsylvania court also found control relevant in the
Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532, 1543-44 (W.D. Mich. 1989)); United States v.
Pesses, No. 90-0654, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7902 at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 6, 1998)
(exempting a savings and loan from CERCLA liability where it did not participate
in the management of the facility and merely held title to the property as security
for a loan). See generally Scagnelli, supra note 50, at 709-10.
178. See United States v. N.L. Indus., No. 91-578-JLF, 1992 WL 359986 (S.D.
Ill. April 23, 1992) (noting that the extent of control or benefits necessary to be
considered an owner under CERCLA is not clear from this definition).
179. See generally Topol & Snow, supra note 34, at § 3.6, n.48 (discussing treatment of control as element used in determining ownership within corporate veil
piercing context). Courts have indicated that they might look to shareholders in
assigning corporate liability under CERCLA. See id. at 181. For example, in U.S. v.
Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D. N. H. 1988), the district court required a plaintiff to allege that a shareholder so dominated a corporation that it did not have
separate autonomy. Similarly, in City of N.Y. v. Exxon Corp., 112 B.R. 540, 552-53
(S.D. N.Y. 1990), affd in part, 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991), the district court indicated that CERCLA liability could be incurred via a controlled subsidiary's actions,
resulting in a piercing of the corporate veil.
180. See Quadion Corp., 738 F. Supp. at 274 (denying motions to dismiss for
failure to properly allege ownership and control because trustee may have had
sufficient "authority to control" waste-handling practices and capacity to prevent
hazardous waste damage, possibly incurring CERCLA liability). Courts have determined that shareholders of a closely-held corporation can incur Superfund liability
despite a dearth of evidence warranting a corporate veil piercing. See id. The Quadion court examined the individual's authority to control waste handling practices,
the distribution of power within the corporation, including the individual's position in the corporate hierarchy, and the percentage of shares owned. See id.
181. See United States v. DiBiase Salem Realty Trust, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20031 at *17 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1993) (upholding broad meaning of "owner" under
CERCLA such that term includes people who possess same evidence of ownership
equal to those who hold title); see also United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d
1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating creditor may incur section 107(a)(2), as
amended 42 U.S.C.A. §9607(a) (2) liability without being an operator by participating in financial management of facility to degree indicating capacity to influence
corporation's treatment .of hazardous wastes). The lender's capacity to influence
facility's treatment of waste will generally be inferred from financial management,
absent evidence of active waste management control. See id. But either a financial
management allegation or an operational management allegation is sufficient as a
matter of law to hold a secured creditor liable under CERCLA. See id.
182. See United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346,
1358-59 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding no ownership where only connection to land was
Northern Trust's capacity as trustee).
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sense that the holding of legal title must be by a conscious
8 3

choice.1

Although most ownership questions are simple, because legal
title holders are also often equitable title holders, other ownership
situations present a more serious problem.18 4 Parties that are most
likely to find themselves in atypical circumstances, where ownership
assessment is complicated and control issues are most salient include: fiduciary owners (i.e., trustees) and equity title holders (i.e.,
partners within partnerships) .185 As discussed above, courts vary
with regard to whether bare legal title is sufficient for proving ownership for such groups. 18 6 A discussion of these categories is necessary before analyzing the Canadyne rule.
1. Trustees as Owners
Trustees are a particular kind of fiduciary.' 8 7 There is no question that these fiduciaries can be liable under CERCLA as own183. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1277 (E.D. Pa.
1994) (holding defendant would not be liable as owner if co-defendant put defendant's name on deed without his knowledge or consent and defendant continued
to be ignorant that his name was on deed, but took action as soon as he found his
name was on the deed). The court found that to be an "owner" under CERCLA,
defendant must have manifested some intent to own the property. See id. This
intent could be illustrated, for example, by a contribution to purchase price, or by
agreement to be ajoint owner, or knowledge that another person bought the land
under both names. See id. Here, the court held that defendant's control or even
knowledge of what went on at the site is not relevant to the inquiry. See id. "In
keeping with CERCLA's strict liability ... the intent required is merely an intent to
own, not an intent that hazardous wastes be deposited on the land.. . ." Id.
184. See, e.g., PetersenSand & Grave4 806 F. Supp. at 1359 (stating title refers to
legal relationship to land while ownership is comparable to control and denotes
interest in real estate other than holding tile). In short, some courts have required some control above and beyond tide holding. See id. at 1358. In this case,
the court concluded that the beneficiary bears the burden of land ownership. See
id. The court further concluded that to hold otherwise would not serve CERCLA's
primary goal of making those who are responsible for or who benefit from environmental damage pay the bill. See id. at 1359. The court concluded by stating
that Congress might have made owners strictly liable because ownership is generally a good proxy for responsibility, paper ownership like that of an Illinois land
trustee is wholly unrelated to responsibility and, therefore, holding of title is not
sufficient for determining CERCLA ownership. See id.
Other courts have found ownership even when legal title was not held based
on the party's control, an analysis similar to operator analysis. See, e.g., Casterlock
Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Fordham, 871 F. Supp. 360, 364 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
185. See Petersen Sand & Grave4 806 F. Supp. at 1358 (deciding case where
legal and equitable ownership did not necessarily coexist).
186. See id. (distinguishing title and ownership under Illinois law).
187. See Gerry W. Beyer, WiLLs TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 399 (1999) (stating that
at common law, trustee is holder of legal title to property). See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.
§14-8-8(f) (Michie Version) (stating that partnerships and not individual partners
own real property held in name of partnership).
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ers. 188 Although trustees are not listed as a PRP classification under
§10 7 (a), they face liability under CERCLA as owners because they
hold title to real estate. 18 9 As stated above, however, whether or not
a party will be deemed an owner based on their relationship to the
land will depend on state law. 190
Successors to trustees are also potentially liable under CERCLA
as owners. 19 1 Trust law typically does not hold a successor to a trust
liable under a former trustee's liability. 192 Nonetheless, ACA holds
a successor to a trustee liable as a fiduciary when acting for the
benefit of another party, "under an indenture agreement, trust
agreement, lease, or similar financing agreement, for debt securities, certificates of interest or certificates of participation in debt
securities, or other forms of indebtedness as to which the trustee is
not, in the capacity of trustee

.....

193

Some courts have held that holding legal title amounts to ownership under CERCLA even in situations where title is held for the
benefit of someone else. 194 In such jurisdictions, trustees will be
188. See Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, THE LAW OF
§§265, 265.1 (4th ed. 1988) (stating trustees hold legal title to real property); see also United States v. Burns, 1988 U.S. Dist. WL 242553 at *2. A trustee
holds title to real estate in most states, although such title is for the benefit of the
trust.
189. See CERCLA §107(n), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n) (showing although trustees are
not specifically mentioned under section 107(a) of CERCLA, they are particularly
listed under section 107(n) and as result, clearly intended to be included in CERCLA). For a discussion of PRPs in CERCLA, see supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
190. See generallyJohnson, supra note 13, at 181.
191. See generally Roger C. Siske, Michael R. Maryn & Barbara L. Smith, What's
New in Compensation Matters: A Summary of Current Case and OtherDevelopment, SD56
ALi-ABA 1 (1999) (discussing particularities with regards to liability of successor
trustees).
192. See generally Richard F. Chatfield-Taylor, Successors Beware: Expanding the
Liability Net Under CERCLA Section 9607(a) Through Application of Successor NonLiability in Asset Acquisitions, 29 WASHBURN LJ. 442, 445 (1990) (discussing successor
liability under state trust law); see also Robert D. Cox, Jr., EnvironmentalLiabilities of
Fiduciaries,35 B. B.J. 17, 19 (March/ April 1999) (stating that generally, "a successor trustee is not liable for the acts of a predecessor trustee" but that they, nonetheless, could be); CERCLA §107(n), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n) (stating that trustees can
be potentially liable under CERCLA).
193. CERCLA §107(n), 42 U.S.C. §9607(n).
194. See generally United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp.
573, 579 (D. Md. 1 986)(stating in case where mortgagee foreclosed, acquired
mortgaged property and held title for over four years, lender no longer entitled to
security interest exemption and liable as owner of contaminated property); see also
Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Horman Family Trust, 960 F.2d 917, 924 (10th Cir.
1992) (ruling action can be maintained against trust and trustee relating to contaminated property owned by trust); State of North Carolina v. W.R. Peele, Sr.
Trust, 876 F. Supp. 733, 742-43 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (stating action can be maintained
against trust holding assets of decedent who was CERCLA covered person).
TRUSTS
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held liable as owners regardless of their control over the trust
195
property.
Other courts have relied less on title for assessing CERCIA
ownership.1 96 For example, a Massachusetts court in United States v.
DiBiase Salem Realty Trust1 9 7 remarked that it was consistent with
CERCLA's legislative history not only to hold those persons who
possess title to a vessel or facility liable but also to hold liable those
who, in the absence of possessing title, have some equivalent evidence of ownership.

198

Still other courts have deviated from the use of title for assessing CERCLA ownership and have held that being a land trustee was
not "owning" land for purposes of liability under CERCLA. 199 The
Federal District Court in Illinois in United States v. Petersen Sand &
Gravel, Inc. 20 0 held that a bank which was determined a trustee and

found to hold legal title to the land making up the site during each
release at issue still was not an owner under CERCLA.20 1 The court
195. See United States v. DiBiase Salem Realty Trust, 45 F.3d 541, 545 (ist Cir.
1995) (noting that CERCLA's legislative history suggests broad meaning to term
"owner," intending it to include not only those persons who hold tide to vessel or
facility, but those who, in absence of holding tide, possess some equivalent evidence of ownership, and accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of
government).
196. See Louisiana v. Braselman Corp., 78 F. Supp.2d 543, 553 (E.D. La. 1999)
(finding railroad that leased facility that used creosote to treat wood was "owner"
of hazardous waste site within meaning of CERCLA). The Braselman court was
persuaded that even though the railroad did not have title to property, it executed
contracts for construction of creosote works and asserted control over property
and hence, was an owner. See id.; see also KC. 1986 Ltd. Partnership v. Reade Mfg.,
33 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1154 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (indicating that site control constitutes
important consideration in determining who qualifies as "operator" under
§107(a), and that lessees essentially stand in shoes of property owners by maintaining control over and responsibility for use of site). According to the Reade court,
lessees having adequate indicia of control will be considered owners for purposes
of determining CERCLA liability. See id. But see Commander Oil Corp. v. Barlo
Equipment Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that lessee lacked
most of bundle of rights associated with ownership).
197. 45 F.3d 541, 543 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding party liable for polluting site
although party did not hold tide to site).
198. See id. at 545 (discussing liability of owners who fails to mitigate pollution, but who is less culpable than polluting party).
199. See NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Corp., 933 F. Supp. 1409, 1418-19
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (discussing importance of beneficial ownership beyond merely
having financial interest in property as requirement of CERCLA owner status); see
also United States v Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1358-59 (N.D.
Ill. 1992) (minimizing importance of holding title to determining ownership
equation).
200. Peterson Sand & Grave4 806 F. Supp. 1358-59 (concluding that holding
Illinois land trustee as owner would fail to meet goals of CERCLA).
201. See id. at 1358 (discussing Illinois statutory law regarding land trustees).
The land trust in Illinois was created at common law. See id. (quoting People v.
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reasoned that under Illinois law, tifle for a land trust is hardly more
than a form of rifle registration and since CERCLA seeks to impose
liability on "responsible parties," finding "ownership" under CERCLA would require elements of control. 20 2 In sum, that court
20
found a distinction between title and ownership under CERCLA.
The same federal Illinois court in NutraSweet Co. v. X-L Engineering Corp.204 held, in a summary judgment proceeding, that a trustee
who was a 90% shareholder of a facility was not an owner for CERCLA purposes, despite having been the land's taxpayer, because a
limited partnership was the holder of beneficial tile, not the
20 5
trustee.
2.

Partnershipsas Owners

Partnerships are entities owned by partners. 20 6 Although
somewhat obvious, the significance of the point is paramount. A
party who seeks contribution will often wish to hold partners individually liable. 20 7 Although current general trust law and most
modern state statutory law hold that partnerships, rather than individual partners actually hold rile, state case law historically has devi20 8
ated on the issue.
The Eleventh Circuit found that there was no need for a common federal law because there was already relative uniformity
Chicago Tile & Trust Co., 329 N.E. 2d 540, 543 (1979)). The beneficiary has only
a property interest. See People, 329 N.E. 2d at 543. All but one of the incidents of
ownership, however, remain with the beneficiary. See id. at 545. It is the beneficiary, not the trustee, who has full management and control over the property, thus
making the beneficiary an owner. See id. at 545-46.
202. See Petersen Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. at 1359 (analyzing ownership in
contexts of legal and equitable ownership). The court stated that trustees have no
control over the land, and thus concluded that imposing hefty penalties would not
improve CERCLA compliance. See id.
203. See id. (distinguishing holding of tile and ownership).
204. 933 F. Supp. 1409, 1418 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (discussing parties included as
PRPs under CERCLA).
205. See id. (discussing beneficial ownership as element of ownership analysis
for CERCLA purposes).
206. See U.P.A. §201 (1994) (stating that partners own partnerships but that
partnerships, nonetheless, are entities distinct from their partners).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Ringley, 985 F.2d 185 (Va. Ct.App. 1993) (holding general partners of partnership which owed Federal Government unpaid reclamation fees as required under 30 U.S.C.A. §1232(a) were, as operators within
meaning of that section, individually liable for reclamation fees).
208. See, e.g.,
O.C.G.A. § 14-8-8(f) (stating under Georgia partnership law,
partnership, not individual partners, owns real property held in name of partnership). But see Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 178 S.E.2d 198, 200 (Ga. 1970) (stating
older Georgia law that "[l]egal tile to real property can never vest in a partnership
as such; legal tile is in the partners as tenants in common").
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among state ownership law. 20 9 Although such law is relatively uniform, as shown above, there are differences. 210 Moreover, uniformity of such law decreases the further back in time one traces. Thus,
if consideration of older case law is required in determining prior
2 11
ownership, a greater need for a common federal law exists.
Given the propensity for non-uniformity among state law the earlier
in time one traces, the first prong of the Kimbell Foods test is best
accomplished through a test that eliminates this diversity.
B.

Applying State Law Threatens Congress' Goal of Holding
Only Responsible Parties Liable

Any argument for or against an issue involving CERCLA based
on a theory supported by Congress' intent is destined for criticism.

212

It is generally accepted, however, that Congress intended

CERCLA to operate so that responsible parties would ultimately be
liable for the cleanup or contribution for cleanup of environmental
hazards. 213 Nonetheless, the scope of the remedial purpose canon
is open for debate. 2 14 This has lead some courts to broadly apply
the canon to sweep as many people as possible into CERCLA's
net.2 15 Other critics, however, claim that courts have gone too far
209. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1489.
210. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Illogic and Limits of Partners' Liability in
Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31, 34 (discussing different approaches of state
partnership law and bankruptcy law to issues concerning partnership debt).
211. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (determining that greater need exists for adopting common federal law where state law
differs more among states). It is possible that the Eleventh Circuit did not endorse
the use of historical state case law in determining prior ownership. See Canadyne,
183 F.3d at 1269 (looking to old state statutory law but not specifically discussing
historical state common law). The Court's opinion in Canadyne does not make the
point clear. See id. Certainly the district court relied on case law. See Canadyne,982
F. Supp. at 889 (analyzing historical state common law). Nonetheless, even if the
Canadyne rule is a historical state statutory law rule only, Kimbell Foods does not
weigh in favor of such a rule. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728. The answer to the
first prong of the Kimbell Foods test, which asks whether diversity in state law raises
the need for a common federal law, would be because even state statutory law can
vary, especially the further back in time concerned. See id.
212. See Garrou, supra note 3, at 147-48 (stating paucity of congressional guidance will challenge reviewing courts in attempt to further purposes of statutes).
213. See generally Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Truck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662,
680 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating one of primary goals of CERCLA was to hold those
parties responsible for releases'liable).
214. See Mohr, supra note 16, at 1157 (describing remedial purpose canon
and its role in courts pursuing Congress' intent in applying CERCLA).
215. See, e.g., Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273 (broadly applying PRP category of
prior owner to bring party under control of CERCLA). The Eleventh Circuit felt
that because the Bank owned a general partnership interest that owned the site in
question, the Bank effectively owned the Site. See id. The Canadyne Court con-
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and are holding parties liable who are not even classified as
216
PRPs.
Even in an expansive application of this canon, however, courts
must limit their findings of potential responsibility to the categories
listed in §107 of CERCLA.2 1 7 As far as prior ownership is concerned, Congress' goal can be restated as holding those who previously owned a site that is now subject to cleanup shall be
responsible for cleaning up the site.2 1 8 Since it is against Congress'
intent that non-owners be held liable, a rule cannot stand which
2 19
would label non-owners as such.
If a claim is brought that contends to hold a prior owner liable
under CERCLA, the manner in which ownership is determined will
have a significant effect on whether or not that entity is ultimately
held liable. 220 The problem is that CERCLA provides little guidance in outlining who qualifies as prior owners. 22' If the rule is
that state law is used in defining ownership, then the term "responsible party" must be understood according to the applicable state
law. A rule cannot make someone an owner who is not an owner.
cluded that the Bank was an "owner" under Georgia law and, ipso facto, for the
purposes of CERCLA. See id.
216. See generally Mohr, supra note 16, at 1157-59 (discussing criticisms to
courts' over-broad application of CERCLA's potential responsibility provisions).
After pointing out that CERCLA liability can easily exceed the value of the land,
Mohr contends that the best way to control this liability is to avoid triggering it in
the first place. See id. at 1157-58. Mohr also points to only using land where contractual indemnity can be obtained as a common method to minimize CERCLA
liability. See id. at 1158.
217. See CERCLA §107, 42 U.S.C. §9607 (setting forth categories of PRPs and
manner in which liability is to be determined under CERC[A).
218. See H. REP. NO. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 15 (1985) (noting
that Congress intended that responsible parties be held liable for costs of clean-ups
associated with sites relating to that responsibility). In applying CERCLA, the
Committee on the Judiciary noted that there were three necessary elements: first,
the need for the effective and speedy clean-up of hazardous waste sites in order to
protect human life and environment; second, the need to protect the interests and
rights of those affected by the sites; and third, the need to protect the interests and
rights of those who may be held liable for such clean-up. See id.
219. See id. (setting forth PRP categories in which category "non-owners" is
not found). See also Garrou, supra note 3,at 113 (quoting Rep. Barney Frank as
stating "[p] art of having a tough and comprehensive [CERCLA] program is having
provisions that allow innocent individuals to be treated as innocent individuals").
Rep. Frank also pointed out that nothing is more damaging to a regulatory scheme
than to inadvertently apply it to innocent individuals. See id.
220. See Zygmunt, supra note 17, at 264 (discussing significance of PRP
question).
221. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Catellus Development
Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[t]he circularity of [the]
definition [of "owner"] renders it useless"). The Ninth Circuit was not convinced
that CERCLA's definition of owner and operator- "any person owning or operating
such facility"- provided any guidance as to how to define "owner." See id.
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A state law rule must not be applied so that it creates owners out of
non-owners. Because state common law effectuates the intent of
legislatures in many cases, a state statutory rule or a partial preemp22 2
tion rule ignoring controlling case law is not satisfactory.
The most reasonable means of determining prior ownership
under CERCLA is to adopt a federal common law holding that current state ownership law applies only to the extent that such law
does not incorporate non-contemporary state law. This rule preserves the sovereignty of state law to the fullest extent possible while
simultaneously increasing uniform treatment under the federal
Superfund Act. Moreover, this proposed rule takes away the conflict that results when state case law interferes with Congress' goal
that CERCLA be a strict liability statute. 223 Finally, the proposed
rule eliminates the negative effects of the historical "state statutory
law only" rule. 2 24 This rule advances Congress' intent to hold only

responsible parties liable, thereby satisfying the second prong of
22 5
the Kimbell Foods analysis.
C.

Having a Federal Common Law Would Not Disrupt
Commercial Relationships Predicated on State Law

The Eleventh Circuit's primary concern for rejecting a federal
common law in Redwing Carrierswas that the expectations of parties
entering into partnership agreements might be frustrated. 2 26 The
proposed rule does not have that effect because it applies only to
prior owners and operators. For the same reasons that courts uni222. See Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F. Supp. 931, 949 (C.D.
Cal. 1993) (holding that, for purposes of liability pursuant to §107(a) (3) of CERCLA, cities "owned or possessed" wastes for which they had "arranged" with transporter for transport for disposal). The district court reasoned in part that the state
statutes and case law required the cities to provide waste collection service and that
the cities clearly would have owned or possessed the waste collected if they had
provided that service themselves. See id. at 955. In so reasoning, the district court
implicidy refers to the invaluable nature of state case law in giving effect to state
statutory law.
223. See generally Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1554 (stating that standard of
strict liability was appropriate under CERCLA); see also CERCLA 107(a) (1), 42
U.S.C. §9607(a) (1) (setting forth strict liability standard under CERCLA).
224. See Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269 (failing to apply state common law as did
district court). For a discussion of the possibility that the Eleventh Circuit adopted
a "state statutory law only" rule, see supra note 111 and accompanying text.
225. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (listing as second prong, whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs); see
also FloridaPower & Light, 893 F.2d at 1317 (stating that objective underlying federal Superfund Act was to hold PRPs liable).
226. See Redwing Carriers,94 F.3d at 1502 (noting Eleventh Circuit's rationale
for not formulating federal common law).
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formly apply CERCLA retroactively, it stands that there would be no
2 27
commercial relationships in existence to be disrupted.
The proposed rule would be applicable only to PRPs described
in §107(a) (2), namely the owners or operators of a facility at the
time the hazardous wastes were disposed. 228 Thus, this rule is not
applicable for present owners and operators. 229 The natural result
of this is that at the time of litigation a prior owner subject to this
rule would no longer be involved with the entity and therefore, the
proposed rule would not effect the expectations of that prior
owner. Moreover, in most instances, the proposed rule would benefit prior owners because subsequent versions of ownership statutes
tend to place legal ownership in the hands of a partnership and not
individuals. 23 0 Thus, even if a party is effected, the result of this
rule may not be negatively regarded. The proposed rule, therefore,
231
passes muster under the third prong of the Kimbell Foods analysis.
VII.

CONCLUSION

While ACA was a step toward greater comprehensiveness
through its clarification of Congress' intent of creating fiduciary liability, Congress should not rely on judicial interpretation to
broaden the reach of CERCLA's proverbial "net of potential responsibility." Instead, Congress should seize this opportunity and
clearly define the extent to which state law should apply in defining
"potential responsibility." In doing so, competing values of strict
liability and broad potential responsibility must be weighed. Unfortunately, however, it is unlikely that Congress will provide the clarification required. As a result, it is thus up to the courts to fashion
rules according to their best guess of Congress' intent.
227. See generally Johnson, supra note 13, at 265.
228. See CERCLA §107(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. §9607(a) (2) (listing owners and operators as PRPs).
229. See id. (listing owners and operators as PRPs).
230. See, e.g.,
O.C.G.A. §14--8(f) (stating that under current Georgia law,
partnership, not individual partners, owns real property held in name of
partnership).
231. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (listing as third prong, whether application of federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state
law). Since commercial relationships would not be disrupted any more than they
already are as a result of CERCLA's retroactive application, the rule should pass
muster. See id. But see S. REP. No. 103-349, at 39-41 (1994) (listing as area of criticism, that retroactive liability system of CERCLA is unfair). Despite criticisms that
the retroactive application scheme is unfair, it continues to be the law. See Fina,
Inc. v. ARCO, 200 F.3d 266, 269 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting retroactive liability scheme
of CERCLA).
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Caselaw often gives meaning to the statutory law and often is
accepted as part and parcel of such statutes, much like an indispensable supplement to a book.2 32 Ignoring such caselaw can lead to a
23 3
result never intended by the statute.
Until the Supreme Court rules on the issue of preemption, it is
up to the lower courts to juggle these issues and decide for themselves which rule to adopt. Partial preemption may preserve CERCLA's strict liability scheme but may also lead to the
aforementioned non-intended finding of ownership. 234 A common
federal law for determining ownership for purposes of CERCLA,
which would repeal state statutes insofar as such statutes incorporate dated state law, would eliminate this problem. Moreover, it
would be consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Bestfoods
and satisfy the Kimbell Foods test. Thus, where ownership involves a
state statute, which exists without repealing former acts, courts
should adopt a common federal standard, whereby for purposes of
CERCLA, the non-repealed aspect of the state statute is repealed.
The question of whether state case law should be used to
broaden potential responsibility under CERCLA should be left for
Congress' consideration. If Congress wants to expand potential responsibility under CERCLA, it should take the initiative to draft language in to CERCLA which would permit such a result. For better
or worse, such an amendment would result in a more "comprehensive" CERCLA.
Timothy Holly

232. See, e.g., Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999) (standing as example
that federal statutes are often related to and sometimes dependent on non-statutory law). Thye shows that once it has been determined that state law creates sufficient interests in the taxpayer to satisfy the requirements of the federal tax lien
statute, state law is inoperative to prevent the attachment of liens created by federal statutes in favor of the United States. See id. (citing 26 U.S.C.A. §6321) (codifying law, commonly known as "federal tax lien statute").
233. Compare Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A. (South), 982 F.
Supp. 886, 889 (M.D. Ga. 1997) (applying state common law to question of ownership and concluding Bank would not have been regarded as owner under state
statutory law in effect at time of Bank's alleged ownership) with Canadyne-Georgia
Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A. (South), 183 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (failing to
apply cases as district court did and concluding Bank could be regarded as owner
under prior state statutory law).
234. See generally United States v. Fleet Factors, Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554
(11th Cir. 1990) (stating standard of strict liability was appropriate under
CERCLA).
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